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ABSTRACT 
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Title: The Cost of China’s Rise: How a Displacement of the Dollar’s Reserve Currency 
Status Would Affect the United States 
 
Supervising Professors: Dr. Keith Brown, Dr. Linda Gerber 
 
 
 In 2009, Chinese government officials suggested the U.S. economy’s high debt 
level made the dollar vulnerable, and a change from the dollar to a different primary 
reserve currency might be needed. This thesis seeks to answer the question of whether 
the rising importance of the Chinese yuan will undermine the U.S. dollar’s importance 
globally, and how a possible change could impact the U.S. economy. The paper begins 
with a background section explaining what reserve currencies are, and how the 
mechanisms behind both reserve currencies and foreign exchange work. The second 
chapter includes an explanation of the current role of the U.S. dollar internationally and 
why reserve currency status matters. The main part of the thesis explores the strengths 
and weaknesses of the U.S. dollar and the Chinese yuan respectively. The effects of the 
dollar’s reserve currency status on the U.S. economy are analyzed using scholarly 
research and primary interviews conducted with portfolio managers in the U.S. and 
China. The author concludes that the dollar will likely not be threatened by the Chinese 
yuan within the next ten to twenty years. The yuan lags behind the dollar in many areas 
important for its candidacy as an international reserve currency. The areas where the 
dollar currently leads the yuan include financial market depth and transparency, usage 
in transactions worldwide, greater access to markets, reduced capital controls, and 
restrictions on capital inflows and outflows. In order for the yuan to gain a more 
international role, the Chinese government must allow the yuan to float freely against 
all other currencies, so that investors and governments can have full faith that the 
currency is trading at an accurate value without interference. A hypothetical 
displacement of the dollar’s reserve currency status would result in mixed effects on the 
U.S. economy by improving the potential for exporting but raising borrowing costs. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
 The day of the dollar’s demise is an eventful one for John, a senior portfolio manager at a 
large endowment fund headquartered in New York. He checks the charts on his array of screens 
before opening another article from The Wall Street Journal, hoping that his phone will stop 
ringing. A television blares in the background with the dire economic predictions of a talking 
head who feigns shock at the slumping markets and analysis from pundits of all kinds. After 
years of predictions of the dollar’s downfall, several agreements have gone into place among 
central banks around the world that officially establish the Chinese yuan the world’s primary 
reserve currency. The dollar’s reign as the dominant international reserve currency has ended, 
and the new currency system is hailed by China and Europe as the dawn of “a new era of foreign 
exchange stability.” John has his doubts, but he moves over to the Bloomberg terminal to begin 
work on a market update for his Board of Directors. Despite the relative lack of surprise of the 
announcement, the markets react poorly to the official announcement of the new reserve 
currency system. The Federal Reserve Chairman comes on the television in the background to 
speak, and John turns to watch momentarily. The Chairman acknowledges the turbulent 
economic conditions ahead, attempting to calm the fears of investors and everyday people. In 
John’s opinion, his message rings a little hollow. A check of the markets at the conclusion of the 
speech confirms his prediction: investors were not assuaged. The best estimates of economists 
suggest that domestic GDP will contract by 1.5%, and unemployment will rise by almost a 
percent as a result (Eichengreen, 2011). John knows that the increase in volatility in the markets 
could also trigger panic selling. To the best of his ability, he had warned his family members and 
friends that the downfall of the dollar was coming, and now many people, including his loved 
ones, face real effects on their wallets from something they could not control. Government 
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programs like Social Security, already bordering on insolvency, were now at risk of almost 
certain termination. John knew the government could no longer finance its exorbitant level of 
spending due to the lower demand for dollars. He also felt, however, that the situation would 
eventually balance out. The current situation was bad enough. He hoped that the former 
drawbacks of being the world’s reserve currency would now become the country’s benefits. 
Exports, for instance, could theoretically increase with the drop in the dollar’s price relative to 
many currencies around the world. Perhaps the news was not as bad as the pundits said. He 
opened his email and began to type out his update. 
John first considered the history of international currency regimes and how paradigm 
shifts had affected other world powers as a means of introduction. The British pound had been 
dominant on the world’s stage for about 80 years, but it had been overtaken quickly by the dollar 
in the 1940s. The devastation of World War II and the U.S. economic engine had erased the large 
British advantage in total foreign exchange holdings. The amount of British pounds held by 
foreign governments had been nearly double that of the U.S. dollar in 1940, but the dollar had 
surpassed the pound by the war’s end (Chinn and Frankel, 2008). Since the Bretton Woods 
Conference made the change official in 1944, the United States dollar had served as the world’s 
primary reserve currency. John wiped the perspiration off his forehead and once again 
considered his family. For the average American citizen, the dollar’s reserve currency status had 
been nothing more than a source of national pride or a cursory mention in an opinion piece on 
China’s economic expansion. The debates between a tired-looking Federal Reserve chairman and 
an upset foreign government partisan or two pundits on CNBC arguing about which currency 
could soon replace the dollar did not hold much meaning to Main Street America. It seemed to 
average Americans that the dollar’s prominent status was just a fact of life, and one that was not 
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easily disturbed. After all, the dollar had survived the financial crisis in the late 2000s, so what 
other problems could possibly doom it? John thought about the simple privilege Americans had 
to use their currency to buy everything from groceries to the latest iPhone. Most people did not 
worry about the dollar’s place in the world because they did not have to; instead, they just 
wanted to know how many dollars were coming into their households. John knew, however, that 
the dollar’s role was more than just a means of buying goods. When a foreign country’s currency 
begins to collapse, the dollar was usually the safe currency of choice. Dollars were also the 
currency of choice for multinational corporations around the world. For U.S. companies, the 
dollar’s prominence allowed for lower costs; since transactions were generally carried out in 
dollars instead of a foreign currency, foreign exchange was not necessary. The demand for 
dollars also allowed for lower borrowing costs since the majority of debt was denominated in 
dollars. John considered how many of these benefits would be lost and realized that he was not 
sure. More research would be needed.  
John thought back to when he first heard the idea that the dollar’s position in the world 
was precarious. Some of the arguments against the dollar had appeared to him to be bluster by 
foreign politicians upset with the U.S., while others seemed to have some potential support. The 
dollar’s relative strength has undergone cycles of apparent strength and weakness over the past 
60 years depending on the political and economic environment. The most recent test of the dollar 
occurred during the recession from 2008-2010 in the United States. During that time and just 
after, John recalled how Chinese officials and economists began to suggest that the dollar might 
not be the ideal reserve currency for the world. At the time, the U.S. government was fighting off 
a collapse of the financial system, and the Federal Reserve responded by injecting large amounts 
of cash into the economy thereby lowering interest rates. The high amount of government 
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spending during the Bush Administration thus carried over into the Obama Administration 
despite the fact that the U.S. owned a lower percentage of the world’s GDP with the rise of 
China and other emerging markets. As the U.S. economy continued to suffer in 2010, Chinese 
officials saw a strategic opportunity to sow seeds of support for the yuan: ‘“. . . it is perhaps a 
good time for the befuddled world to start considering building a de-Americanized world,” wrote 
Liu Chang for China’s official news agency Xinhua” (Conerly, 2013). The comments by Chinese 
officials and others piqued John’s curiosity to do more research on reserve currencies. While he 
did not think the U.S. government had an unfair or undue advantage with the dollar’s global 
status, he resolved to find out how the U.S. economy was actually being affected, if at all.  
John recalled how wide-ranging the opinions on the dollar were only a few years prior. 
Some economists predicted that the loss of the dollar’s reserve currency status would have 
serious negative economic consequences, especially given the relative partisanship in Congress. 
Barry Eichengreen, a professor and researcher at the University of California at Berkeley, argued 
that the dollar’s downfall could have significant effects on the U.S. economy (Eichengreen, 
2011). Despite the dollar’s position on shaky ground, Eichengreen did not see a large threat to 
the dollar in 2011. Other experts, such as author and economist Paul Krugman, argued that 
concerns over the dollar’s reserve currency status were overblown since the dollar continued to 
be the most viable option of any currency (Krugman, 2013). Krugman also did not believe that 
reserve currency status provided any sort of special privileges, including outsized deficit 
spending or lower borrowing costs. With all of this information in mind, John finally began to 
type out the body of his email. He knew that it was going to be a significant challenge to 
determine how the U.S. economy would be affected by the switch to the yuan, but he resolved to 
find out.  
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Thesis Overview 
This thesis will address the following question: Will the increasing importance of the 
Chinese yuan undermine the U.S. dollar’s predominance as a reserve currency? The question 
will be explored from the angle of both the United States and China. The main areas of 
exploration will include determining the likelihood of the yuan to become the primary global 
reserve currency as well as a potential timeline for its ascent. Additionally, the economic and 
political impacts on both China and the U.S. from a potential displacement of the dollar’s reserve 
currency status will be analyzed. The primary methods of research utilized were journals and 
news articles on the subject as well as two interviews conducted with a portfolio manager in the 
U.S. and one in China. Relevant data, charts, and tables are included throughout the paper to 
provide greater clarity on the subject and illustrate the differences between the U.S. and China 
with regard to their economies and their currencies themselves.  
  In Chapter 2, reserve currencies will be introduced and defined, and the basics of foreign 
exchange will be explained. The characteristics of a reserve currency and the dollar’s current role 
as the primary international reserve currency will be explained. A short history of the U.S. dollar 
in foreign exchange will also be discussed. Chapter 3 will go into the specific benefits and 
drawbacks for the U.S. economy because the dollar is the primary reserve currency. Both the 
qualitative effects and the net economic impact on the U.S. economy will be included. Chapter 4 
will begin with a short history of China’s economic rise. The prospects for the Chinese yuan to 
become the primary reserve currency will be addressed as well as the political and economic 
reasons against it. In Chapter 5, conclusions will be drawn on the yuan’s potential to become the 
primary reserve currency and a timeline for it to replace the dollar. The analysis will include 
interviews from a portfolio manager in the U.S. and in China. 
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Chapter 2 – Background on Reserve Currencies 
Introduction 
 In order to properly understand the broader discussion behind the United States dollar’s 
reserve currency status, it is necessary to first understand background details underlying the 
central argument. In this chapter, the concept of a reserve currency will be explained, and the 
current composition of global reserves will be discussed. Furthermore, the U.S. dollar’s role as 
the primary global reserve currency will be introduced with a brief history of how it rose to 
prominence as well as details on the current reasons for its use.  
Reserve Currencies and Foreign Exchange Reserves 
 According to international business professors Charles Hill and Tomas Hult, a reserve 
currency “is a currency that is held in significant quantities by governments and institutions as a 
part of their foreign exchange reserves and that is commonly used in international financial 
transactions” (Hill and Hult, 2015). Foreign exchange reserves are created through trade. When a 
business in one country sells a good or service to another country, it receives a foreign reserve 
currency in exchange. The foreign currency received does not enter the general circulation, but 
instead, it is deposited into a local bank. The foreign currency is then transferred from the local 
bank to the central bank where it is set aside in an account known as “International Reserves” 
within the central bank. Therefore, to put it more simply, reserve currencies are “foreign 
currencies held by central banks” (Radcliffe, 2014). The reserve currencies endorsed by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) are the U.S. dollar, euro, British pound sterling, Japanese 
yen, Swiss franc, Canadian dollar, and Chinese yuan. One important clarifying note: the U.S. 
dollar is by far the most used currency in trade and the most widely held currency by central 
banks around the world (IMF, 2017). Therefore, when the term “primary global reserve 
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currency” is mentioned in this paper, it is referring to the U.S. dollar and not another reserve 
currency. Reserve currencies allow countries and businesses to use a small group of currencies 
(and typically only the U.S. dollar or the euro) to conduct business in the international sphere, 
allowing for lower transaction costs and faster transaction processing.  
Reserve currencies have an important role in international trade by increasing efficiency. 
Instead of having to conduct business in many different currencies, reserve currencies allow for 
companies to buy and sell goods in one of the reserve currencies on nearly all occasions 
(Carbaugh and Hedrick, 2009). The pervasive use of a reserve currency by businesses and central 
banks creates a kind of feedback loop similar to what is seen in network effects.1 The 
employment of the dollar by so many entities increases its value because it makes conducting 
transactions more efficient. If only one currency is being utilized for most transactions, the costs 
for everyone are reduced. This aspect of the dollar helps to cement the currency’s place 
internationally because it increases demand as companies and central banks seek to take 
advantage of these network benefits (Carbaugh and Hedrick, 2009). 
One characteristic of reserve currencies is that they possess stability in terms of their 
future value, usually measured in terms of future purchasing power. The dominant reserve 
currency in particular is selected by institutions because of the strength and stability of a 
country’s economy. Both economic solidity and the relative security of a currency’s value is 
attractive to central banks. One development since the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s is 
for central banks to accumulate large amounts of reserve currencies. Theoretically, central banks 
can slow down or even stop a rapid drop in their domestic currency’s value by selling their 
stockpile of reserve currencies and buying back their own currency (Carbaugh and Hedrick, 
                                                 
1 Or “network externalities” 
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2009). By taking such action, the government and central bank can help restore confidence in the 
domestic currency by helping to stabilize the exchange rate.  
From the perspective of a central bank, a reserve currency must possess several 
characteristics that make it attractive to use in transactions or to hold in reserves. One 
characteristic was already mentioned above – network effects, which are benefits received when 
many people use the same product, or in this case, a currency. When demand for the currency 
becomes self-generating (demand breeds more demand), its liquidity increases and its transaction 
cost declines. In addition to focusing just on the currency, some factors that lead to a reserve 
currency’s rise come from its macroeconomic environment. One such factor is a country’s 
overall trade position. Generally speaking, a reserve currency arises out of a country that has 
high trade output. The reason for this factor is intuitive: when a currency is used repeatedly with 
a frequent trading partner, a country is more likely to use it in general (Carbaugh and Hedrick, 
2009). Another crucial factor is confidence in the political and economic system of the country 
backing the reserve currency. As will be discussed later in this chapter, currencies are volatile, 
and their value can fluctuate quickly in the current era of floating currencies. Whether the value 
is uncertain because of frequent government intervention in the currency’s price, economic 
instability, or poor government or central bank policies, these factors negatively affect how the 
currency is viewed. Without faith that a currency’s value will be stable, a central bank has no 
assurance that its reserves of such a currency will be useful, and it therefore avoids holding them 
(Moghadam, 2009). Finally, reserve currencies generally come from countries with well-
developed financial markets with significant liquidity, access, and size. As an example, consider 
the financial crisis in the United States in 2009. Despite the country’s economic distress, U.S. 
financial markets continued to remain open and liquid for foreign businesses, investors, and 
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governments (Moghadam, 2009). Thus, faith in financial markets is also an important aspect for 
central banks to consider when making a decision on reserve currencies. 
A Short History of Foreign Exchange 
 To understand the current foreign exchange system, it is important to understand how 
foreign exchange has changed in recent history. By the late 19th century, most of the world’s 
largest trading nations had adopted the gold standard as their monetary system. The gold 
standard involves the use of gold as money. Until the early 20th century, the international 
monetary system was a direct gold standard, meaning that a paper currency was “pegged” to 
gold, in that convertibility to a certain value of gold was guaranteed. A currency peg means 
fixation of a currency to a measure of value, such as to a single currency, a basket of currencies, 
or to a physical store of value like gold. The countries that adopted the gold standard, including 
Great Britain, Germany, the United States, and Japan, fixed their currencies to a specified 
amount of gold. The United States, for instance, fixed the price of gold at $20.67 per ounce. 
While a relatively simple monetary system, the gold standard’s appeal came from the ability to 
easily determine the value of one currency against another. For example, take the price of the 
British pound, which was fixed at £1 per $4.87. By dividing $20.67 by $4.87, we receive the 
exchange rate for converting pounds into dollars (Hill and Hult, 2015). By fixing currency 
exchange rates against gold, the price levels of countries globally generally moved together as a 
result of a process called the price-specie flow mechanism.2 Basically, assuming a simple two-
country system, a feedback loop formed each time a country generated a trade surplus. The 
                                                 
2 NASDAQ defines price-specie flow mechanism as follows: “This adjustment mechanism under the 
classic gold standard allowing disturbances in the price level in one country to be wholly or 
partly offset by a countervailing flow of specie (gold coins) that would act to equalize prices across 
countries and automatically bring international payments into balance.” An important outcome of 
price-specie flow mechanism is balance-of-trade equilibrium, which means that trade partners will 
remain generally debt-free after trading with each other over a significant period of time. 
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reason is because more money (gold) leads to higher inflation in the country, which has the 
effect of raising prices in the country that previously had an advantage in exporting due to lower 
prices (Bordo, 2008). 
 By the start of World War I in 1914, the pure gold standard was abandoned by most 
leading economies in Europe because money had to be printed in large quantities – beyond that 
supported by gold reserves – to finance the war effort. The value in terms of gold of the main 
reserve currency at the time, the British pound sterling, became volatile, especially after a surge 
in demand for sterling resulted in more regulation of the currency in the form of exchange 
controls (Eichengreen, 2011). The resulting increase in money supply, along with the suspension 
of the gold standard, increased inflation in Great Britain and in other European countries affected 
by the war. The uncertainty in the sterling and other European currencies made their use less 
attractive to traders in countries around the world, and some of them began to look for an 
alternative. One alternative was the U.S. dollar because its value remained relatively stable as it 
was still pegged to gold and was being increasingly used in world trade. As a result, the shift 
towards the dollar as a reserve currency began by the early 1920s (Eichengreen, 2011). 
Between World War I and World War II, the dollar’s use began to rise, while the 
sterling’s use peaked and then began to fall. The period also marked the end of the “gold 
standard” in the sense that most major countries no longer circulated gold in the form of physical 
coins (called “specie”) and instead only used Treasury notes that were convertible to a certain 
amount of gold upon request (Elwell, 2011). The gold standard was abandoned in the U.S. in 
1933 as a result of a series of moves by the Federal Reserve and the Roosevelt Administration 
that ended convertibility of Treasury notes into gold. A series of bank runs during the Great 
Depression had left the Fed with little liquidity and little ability to meet demands for cash. To 
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stay on the gold standard, the U.S. government would have been required to contract its money 
supply when it needed to expand it to stimulate the economy (Elwell, 2011). The gold standard 
prevented monetary expansion because printing more money to meet the liquidity demands 
would have led to lower interest rates. Lower interest rates would have caused more gold to 
leave the country as investors would have sought higher returns in other countries with higher 
interest rates. This capital flight would have made it difficult or impossible to maintain the dollar 
against its value of gold unless the money supply was lowered. With the change implemented in 
1933, the U.S. moved to a new monetary regime known as the “quasi-gold standard”3 (Elwell, 
2011). 
 The quasi-gold standard signified the end of a pure gold standard and marked the period 
from 1934-1973 (Elwell, 2011). The dollar remained defined in terms of gold, but private 
citizens could no longer exchange dollars for a certain amount of gold. The gold standard was 
therefore suspended with the exception of the use of gold in foreign exchange transactions with 
other central banks (Bordo, 2008). The Bretton Woods agreement in 1944 between 44 countries 
further modified the gold standard and reinforced the rise of the U.S. dollar. Because there was 
not enough gold for every country to hold an adequate amount in reserves, the U.S. dollar and 
British pound were chosen as reserve currencies for the new system. Great Britain, however, 
continued to be affected by high wartime spending and a growing trade deficit that were 
necessary to win World War II. These factors, combined with rumors the pound would be 
devalued after the war ended, resulted in many British trading partners converting their pounds 
to U.S. dollars. In reality, the pound was thus a mostly symbolic reserve currency under Bretton 
Woods (Dawnay, 2001).  
                                                 
3 Some scholars refer to the quasi-gold standard as the “gold exchange standard” 
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The Bretton Woods agreement, while hailed as a new and innovative system, was largely 
a modification of the previous gold standard. Countries fixed their currencies in terms of the U.S. 
dollar (and in rare cases the pound). The dollar remained fixed as before to a certain amount of 
gold. The U.S. dollar conversion rate to gold, the “gold par value,” was initially set at a rate of 
$35 per ounce of gold. Other countries then tied their currencies to a certain amount of gold such 
that they remained within plus or minus 1% (a “band”) of the par value (Hill and Hult, 2015). 
Countries therefore had to manage their currencies by buying and selling foreign currencies and 
gold to stay within the required band. If the currency’s value, known as the “reference rate,” 
moved too far above the fixed benchmark rate of 1%, the government bought its own currency in 
the open market using its reserves to balance supply and demand. The goal was to create an 
environment that would promote global economic growth while maintaining stable currency 
markets. The importance of Bretton Woods for the dollar was significant; its implementation 
meant the dollar’s role as the primary international currency was essentially established by an 
international agreement. The U.S. held the special position as the only currency with 
convertibility to gold because the amount of debt issued by European countries depressed the 
value of their currencies, while the U.S. dollar strengthened and had the highest purchasing 
power due to the increase of U.S. gold reserves (Bordo, 2008). The dollar’s role in the foreign 
exchange market was strengthened because of its liquidity and convertibility. While some 
currencies were not easily convertible, the dollar acted as an intermediary. When one less 
frequently traded currency needed to be converted into another less frequently traded currency, 
the dollar served as the vehicle to more easily exchange the currencies (“Report to Congress,” 
2009). 
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The Bretton Woods system was largely effective until the late 1960s when the system’s 
central reference point, the U.S. dollar, began to weaken. Beginning in the early 1960s, the 
number of dollars in supply worldwide exceeded the amount of U.S. gold reserves, which began 
to cast doubt on the ability of the U.S. government to convert dollars into gold (Bordo, 2009). 
Other political and macroeconomic factors specific to the U.S. aggravated the situation. 
Government spending on the Vietnam War abroad led to an increase in outflow of gold from the 
U.S. At the same time, government spending that had begun with previous administrations 
further increased with President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society domestic spending initiative. 
Because neither of these policy decisions were financed by an increase in taxes, the increased 
spending began to cause higher inflation in the U.S. Foreign countries preferred to keep their 
currencies undervalued to improve their export positions and refused to rebalance to adjust for 
inflation in the U.S., which was putting downward pressure on the purchasing power of the 
dollar (Hill and Hult, 2015). The inflation resulted in the dollar being continuously overvalued in 
comparison to foreign currencies; since countries used the dollar as a reference point, their price 
levels needed to move in concert with the U.S. Some countries agreed not to exchange their 
dollars for gold, which ensured a similar inflation level to the U.S. by increasing the domestic 
money supply. However, a group of other countries, led by France, would not succumb to 
political pressure and continued to redeem their dollars for gold (Hetzel, 2013). As a result, the 
pressure on the dollar’s gold par value continued to build. Within the next several years, the 
continued decrease in gold reserves due to redemptions combined with the increase in the supply 
of dollars forced the Nixon Administration to acknowledge that the pledge to exchange dollars at 
the gold par value of $35 was untenable; the convertibility of dollars to gold was ended. In the 
final year of Bretton Woods, the U.S. total gold reserves were depleted by nearly 15% (Minerd, 
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2012). A temporary international agreement called the Smithsonian Agreement devalued the 
dollar to $38 per troy ounce of gold but did not reinstate convertibility of dollars to gold. 
Pressure on the dollar once again required a devaluation a year later, which failed to stop 
continued downward pressure on the dollar’s purchasing power (Elwell, 2011). In 1973, 
developed countries began to allow their currencies to float against the dollar, which officially 
ended the Bretton Woods system and the quasi-gold standard.  
 The introduction of the floating exchange rate regime was established with the Jamaica 
Agreement at a meeting of IMF members in 1976. The agreement made official what was 
already known informally – the dollar would no longer be defined in terms of gold. The 
predominant monetary system would instead be based on fiat, meaning that governments 
established currencies as legal tender without the backing of a physical store of value such as 
gold. Furthermore, floating exchange rates were declared acceptable, and governments could 
intervene to adjust their exchange rates during times of speculation as they saw fit (Hill and Hult, 
2015). While some countries continued to fix their exchange rate to the dollar, the Jamaica 
Agreement marked a crucial turning point in the global foreign exchange environment. The new 
international monetary system was mixed, with nearly all developed countries choosing to allow 
their currencies to float, while some developing countries allowed their currencies to float, and 
some established one of several non-floating regimes. Perhaps the most crucial distinction of the 
post-Bretton Woods regime compared to the previous regimes is that there is not one distinct 
international monetary system in place.  
 One important result of a floating exchange rate regime among developed economies is a 
greater amount of volatility in exchange rates under the floating regime than was present under 
Bretton Woods (Figure 1) (Hill and Hult, 2015). Changes in inflation or in changes in the growth 
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of money supplies between countries is one possible explanation for volatile exchange rates; 
however, volatility appears to be influenced most by speculation (Krugman, 2002). Speculation 
involves buying and selling currencies and foreign exchange instruments to make a profit. The 
effects of speculation-induced volatility are disputed by economists. Theoretically, exchange rate 
instability could affect international trade volume and the prices of goods by causing price 
swings and shifts in market share, but pricing-to-market, “keeping the prices of their exports 
stable in terms of the importing country's currency,” helps a company mitigate the risks of 
volatility (Krugman, 2002). Thus, the relative stability of goods prices has resulted in somewhat 
fewer than expected negative effects related to volatility. 
Figure 1: Annualized volatility of the U.S. dollar since 1990 
 
Source: NYU Stern School of Business 
 In April 2016, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) reported that average daily 
trading in foreign exchange markets totaled $5.1 trillion, which was down from $5.4 trillion in 
2013 (BIS, 2016). Trading in exchange markets has a heavy bias towards currencies tied to 
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floating exchange rate regimes (Rose, 2011). While comparable data was not made available by 
the BIS in its most recent survey, in 2010, trading in currency pairs from floating exchange rate 
regimes was over 95% of total trading (Rose, 2011). The trading volume of emerging market 
currency pairs has increased significantly over the past few years, as the Chinese yuan nearly 
doubled in turnover over the three year period and overtook the Mexican peso to become the 
eighth most traded currency. The USD-CNY currency pair specifically rose in turnover from 
$113 billion to $192 billion, which moved it from ninth to sixth place in terms of overall share 
among currency pairs (Figure 2) (BIS, 2016).  
Figure 2: Foreign exchange turnover by currency pair 
 
Source: BIS Triennial Survey 
The Dollar’s Role as a Reserve Currency 
The dollar, as with any currency, has three main roles outside of its roles as a reserve 
currency: serving as a medium of exchange, a store of value, and a unit of account. These general 
currency functions are not as complicated as they sound. “Medium of exchange” simply means 
that money must be accepted for trade for a good or service of some value. On its own, money 
cannot be consumed (i.e. you cannot eat money). A “store of value” refers to the ability of a 
currency to hold purchasing power over a period of time. Finally, a currency must serve as a 
Amount %
USD / EUR 1,172  23.1
USD / JPY 901     17.8
USD / GBP 470     9.3
USD / AUD 262     5.2
USD / CAD 218     4.3
USD / CNY 192     3.8
USD / CHF 180     3.6
USD / MXN 90       1.8
USD / SGD 81       1.6
2016
Currency pair
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“unit of account,” which means that it is “a measure used to set prices and make calculations” 
(Krugman and Wells, 2015). As an example, consider the fact that we do not typically exchange 
a number of hours of farming for the opportunity to go to school. Instead, the cost of school 
tuition is denominated in terms of a specific dollar amount.  
These three general currency roles are joined by other roles that are specific to reserve 
currencies. First, the dollar serves an international role as a vehicle currency. As evidenced in the 
discussion on Bretton Woods, reserve currencies provide an important role in conducting 
transactions between currencies that are less frequently traded. When a bank needs to trade these 
types of currencies, they are traded into the U.S. dollar or another reserve currency first instead 
of being converted directly. Because of the dollar’s prominence, the trade is more likely to go 
through because of the perceived and actual liquidity of the dollar. While business is 
occasionally conducted in currencies other than the dollar, the dollar is dominant as a transaction 
currency over even major currencies such as the euro or yen. According to the triennial survey 
conducted by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the U.S. dollar was used in about 
88% of transactions, which was a slight increase over the previous survey (Figure 3) (BIS, 2016).  
Figure 3: Currency distribution of foreign exchange turnover 
 
Source: BIS Triennial Survey 
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The role of the dollar is also significant in settling international trade transactions, 
although this area is more fragmented. According to a 2016 survey by the European 
Commission, the U.S. dollar’s role as a global financing and vehicle currency leads to a dollar 
preference by many firms around the world in spite of geography (Langedijk, Karagiannis, and 
Papanagiotou, 2016). Consider European firms as an example. Since the introduction of the euro 
as a common currency in Europe increased that currency’s share of trade settlements, the euro’s 
share has largely stabilized in recent years. Another piece of supporting evidence comes from a 
more recent set of countries – those countries that just adopted the euro as their national 
currency. In a few of these countries, such as Estonia, the use of the euro in international trade 
surged; however, in other countries, such as Slovakia and Slovenia the euro remains the 
predominant trade currencies without much change (Langedijk, Karagiannis, and Papanagiotou, 
2016). In addition to geography, certain economic sectors may have a significant precedent 
which determines the dollar’s use in trade transactions. For example, the dollar has been 
traditionally used as the primary currency for oil and gas trading, and OPEC countries have 
denominated oil prices in dollars since the early 1970s.  
The dollar’s role in the international monetary system also extends to the international 
debt and loan markets. In recent years, the amount of total debt securities denominated in dollars 
has decreased because of an increase in debt issued in domestic markets in Europe (Goldberg, 
2011). The dollar’s share of a more specific type of debt, international debt securities, has 
actually risen in recent years, with the dollar holding a more than 50% share. This percentage 
share is up from approximately 41% in the early 2000s (Goldberg, 2011). International debt 
securities are defined as “the dollar-denominated share of all securities sold outside the issuing 
country and in a currency different from that of the issuer’s country” and are a gauge of the 
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strength of a currency’s presence in the international monetary system (Goldberg, 2011). The 
dollar’s place among other currencies is also significant in loan markets. The dollar is the leading 
currency in loans between banks as well as between banks and customers. In addition, the dollar 
is the most frequently used currency in loans between banks in different countries, which are 
known as cross-border loans (Goldberg, 2011). 
One of the most well-known uses of the dollar is in the foreign exchange systems of 
individual governments. Some U.S. tourists are familiar with the high regard some foreigners 
place on the dollar and enjoy getting to use dollars in foreign souvenir markets. Some countries 
issue a domestic currency but also permit the dollar’s use because of its domestic viability. In 
other cases, a country may simply use the dollar in place of its own currency. The decision by a 
foreign government to use the dollar as its primary currency is known colloquially as 
“dollarization” and is used by nine countries around the world, including Ecuador, El Salvador, 
and Zimbabwe, to name a few (Schnurer, 2014). In many cases, the dollar is perceived as safer 
and more stable than the local currency, and the switch is often made when the citizens of a 
country lose faith in the local currency and begin to hold dollars. Although this kind of change 
would appear to reduce the sovereignty of a country, the resulting economic stability 
accompanying dollarization is considered a welcome exchange (Schnurer, 2014). The dollar also 
serves as a reference currency in certain foreign exchange rate arrangements undertaken by 
foreign governments. Some governments choose to peg their local currency’s exchange rate 
against a certain reference currency, which is split between the U.S. dollar and the euro 
(Schnurer, 2014).4 The result of a pegged exchange rate system is the movement in concert of the 
                                                 
4 As of 2016, 18 countries are pegged to the euro; 16 countries are pegged to the U.S. dollar; 2 
countries are pegged to the Indian rupee; and 3 countries are pegged to the South African rand. 
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local currency with any movements by the U.S. dollar or another anchor currency. For small 
countries, a currency peg system imposes a sense of monetary discipline since overspending 
could lead to higher inflation than is being experienced in the U.S., which would then force the 
foreign government to alter its peg and devalue the local currency (Hill and Hult, 2015).  
In addition to its use in transactions related to foreign exchange, the dollar also has the 
most prominent role in the foreign exchange reserves of the governments of individual countries. 
Foreign exchange reserves are used by the central banks of governments to back their current 
liabilities as well as a means to influence monetary policy. In the past decade, total allocated 
reserves have grown sharply, from $3.32 trillion at the end of 2006 to $6.82 trillion at the end of 
2015 (IMF, 2016). Growth of foreign exchange reserves slowed during the Great Recession and 
during the more recent economic crisis in many emerging market countries during the last two 
years. Since reserves are often used during crises to stabilize exchange rates, this short-term 
trend is unsurprising (Goldberg, 2011). However, among central banks in both developing and 
developed countries, the dollar’s share in reserve currency asset portfolios has not been diluted 
by continued growth in total reserves. Instead, the dollar’s share of allocated reserves has largely 
stayed the same since the recession (Figure 4). Recently, there has been a trend for some 
governments to diversify their holdings with a greater amount of developing country currencies, 
but this trend has been largely offset by the recent economic crises in developing countries.  
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Figure 4: Shares of IMF allocated reserves by currency
 
Source: IMF COFER Data 
Chapter Summary 
 This introductory chapter discussed important background information, including 
defining a reserve currency as a “currency that is held in significant quantities by governments 
and institutions as a part of their foreign exchange reserves and that is commonly used in 
international financial transactions” (Hill and Hult, 2015). International reserve currencies 
include the U.S. dollar, euro, British pound sterling, Japanese yen, Swiss franc, Canadian dollar, 
and Chinese yuan. While there are multiple global reserve currencies, the U.S. dollar alone will 
be defined as the “primary global reserve currency” for the purposes of this paper. Next, general 
characteristics of reserve currencies were discussed, including: use in international trade, 
stability in terms of future value, and network effects. Reserve currencies are more likely to 
come from countries that are stable politically and economically. Subsequently, a short history of 
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foreign exchange was provided, detailing the changes in the international monetary system and 
explaining some of the mechanism driving it. As the gold standard began its decline around 
World War I, the U.S. dollar began to rise in importance worldwide. The dollar became the 
predominant currency during and after World War II as U.S. economic production expanded 
rapidly. The Bretton Woods system, established in 1944, solidified the dollar’s role by making it 
the central reference point of the new monetary regime. After political and economic pressure 
forced the Nixon Administration to abandon the Bretton Woods system, the U.S. dollar was 
allowed to float, beginning a new system of fiat money. The final section examined the dollar’s 
role as a reserve currency in the modern international monetary system by analyzing how it 
expands on the three traditional roles of a currency: medium of exchange, store of value, and unit 
of account. The dollar’s major reserve currency roles include serving as a primary currency in 
international trade and in international debt securities, where it ranks among the top two 
currencies (along with the euro) in terms of use. The dollar also plays a critical role in the foreign 
exchange systems of foreign governments and is used in roughly half of all fixed exchange rate 
pegs. Finally, the dollar holds the highest share among all currencies in terms of foreign 
exchange reserves held by central banks.  
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Chapter 3 – The U.S. Dollar as Reserve Currency: Benefits and 
Drawbacks for the U.S. Economy 
 
Introduction 
 The U.S. dollar is currently the world’s primary reserve currency and possesses attributes 
that give it a special role in several areas of international finance and economics. The most recent 
increase in interest on the issue of whether the U.S. receives special economic and political 
privileges from its reserve currency status began during the global economic and financial 
downturn in the late 2000s, which later became known as the Great Recession. The debate on the 
dollar’s benefits has fallen along a spectrum. On one side, there is a general belief that the 
strength of the dollar internationally is almost always beneficial, which is popular among 
political pundits and talk radio hosts. Academic researchers and financial news giants such as 
The Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times have analyzed the dollar’s status as a main 
reserve currency in a more nuanced way, stating that it has benefits and drawbacks. In this 
chapter, the dollar’s impact will be examined to determine more precisely what effects reserve 
currency status has on the U.S. economy and on government policy. 
 
Benefits for the U.S. Economy 
 In the 1960s, the French finance minister Valéry Giscard d’Estaing argued that the use of 
the U.S. dollar as the global reserve currency was an “exorbitant privilege” for the United States 
in the international monetary system. 5 Giscard was irritated with the idea that the United States 
could simply print money to fulfill its obligations, including paying for imports. His argument 
                                                 
5 The idea of the dollar’s “exorbitant privilege” inspired the title of an excellent 2010 book by Barry 
Eichengreen - Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar and the Future of the International 
Monetary System. Eichengreen’s research focuses on the history of the dollar’s rise, its current status, and 
its prospects for the future. 
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was that this ability for the U.S. to run up what is called a current account deficit is unique to 
only the country whose currency is dominant worldwide (Canzoneri, Cumby, Diba, & Lopez-
Salido, 2013). In this section, Giscard’s claim that the dollar’s status conveys significant benefits 
to the United States economy and trade position will be explored in addition to other benefits, 
such as seigniorage and low borrowing costs. In addition to determining what the benefits of 
primary reserve currencies are, an attempt will be made to determine the degree of those 
benefits.  
 One of the first discovered advantages of primary reserve currencies, and one that was 
frequently discussed in scholarly debates in the 1950s through the 1960s, is an increase in 
seigniorage for the government of the primary reserve currency. The Financial Times defines 
seigniorage as “the profit made by a government from the printing of money, literally the face 
value of the money minus the cost of physically making it” (“Seigniorage,” n.d.). In other words, 
seigniorage is the income generated by the U.S. government because the value of dollars exceeds 
the cost of making them. American economist Barry Eichengreen puts seigniorage this way: “It 
only costs a few cents for the Bureau of Engraving and Printing to produce a $100 bill, but other 
countries have to pony up $100 of actual goods and services in order to obtain one” 
(Eichengreen, 2010). This simple definition leads us to the role of seigniorage specifically in 
terms of reserve currencies. First, it is important to understand that the Federal Reserve controls 
the money supply of dollars. In order to increase or decrease the money supply, the Fed buys or 
sells Treasury bills, which are short-term U.S. government bonds, from banks that are holding 
them. For example, if the Fed wants to increase the money supply, it would buy Treasury bills 
from banks. The bank who sold the Fed the Treasury bills receives cash, which in turn increases 
the number of dollars in circulation. Recall that as a medium of exchange, the dollar is held by 
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people, businesses, and central banks in foreign countries around the world. The willingness by 
these non-U.S. stakeholders to hold U.S. dollars is effectively “an interest-free loan” for the U.S. 
government (Dobbs, Skilling, Hu, Lund, Manyika, & Roxburgh, 2009). The reason why it can be 
considered an “interest-free loan” is simple: the U.S. government can keep printing money for a 
few pennies per bill, and it will be held by a person or entity overseas because of high demand. 
According to an analysis by the McKinsey Global Institute, the Federal Reserve generates about 
$10-20 billion in seigniorage revenue per year (Dobbs, et al. 2009).  
 The second “privilege” the U.S. benefits from as the issuer of the primary global reserve 
currency is lower borrowing costs as a result of lower interest rates. Lower borrowing costs, 
which are also referred to as lower cost of capital, stem from high demand for dollars in foreign 
countries (Dobbs, et al. 2009). Foreign banks, businesses, and individuals hold significant 
amounts of dollars for several reasons, including a belief that the dollar is a safe haven that can 
protect against the depreciation of their local currency. Many of these foreign entities also see the 
U.S. dollar as convenient because of its frequent use in business and central bank transactions 
(Eichengreen, 2010). These foreign holders of dollar securities such as Treasury bills – which are 
essentially dollar equivalents – value the dollar’s safety and convenience enough to purchase and 
hold them at a lower interest rate than is normally required. As a result, dollar securities typically 
have lower interest rates than foreign securities denominated in other currencies. (Eichengreen, 
2010). Lower interest rates on the issuance of these securities mean that the U.S. government 
does not have to pay as much to borrow money; interest payments over time are lower.  
In order to understand this effect better, its actual impact needs to be estimated. The 
McKinsey Institute found that when foreign purchases of U.S. government securities are isolated 
to only include foreign governments and sovereign wealth funds, the U.S. government’s cost of 
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capital is reduced by approximately 0.5-0.6% (Figure 5) (Dobbs, et al. 2009). However, it is 
important to note that lower interest rates can have negative impacts on banks and others that 
rely on interest income as well. After adjusting for this negative effect, the net benefit for the 
U.S. is approximately $90 billion (Dobbs, et al. 2009). Furthermore, researchers estimate that the 
U.S. government nets approximately two to three percent on interest expense related to general 
foreign liabilities against its rate of return from foreign investments (Eichengreen, 2010). The 
ramifications of this benefit are important for the U.S. balance of payments, which is simply a 
system of accounting for all international transactions of a country. The balance of payments of a 
country helps to determine the flows of money into and out of a country during a specific period 
of time. The current account is one of the major balance of payments accounts and includes the 
balance of trade (goods and services exports minus imports), net income from abroad, and net 
current transfers. Now, because the U.S. nets about a 2-3% reduction in interest payments, it can 
run a balance of trade deficit by this amount without increasing its debt unless it exceeds it. In 
other words, the U.S. can import and consume more goods and services than it exports because 
of this balance of payments advantage (Eichengreen, 2010). If one looks at the current account 
data for the U.S. economy, the U.S. has run a significant balance of trade deficit, and it has 
hovered around $40 billion since 2013 (Figure 6). When Giscard complained about an 
“exorbitant privilege,” he was referring in part to what seemed like an unfair, asymmetric benefit 
for the U.S.; it can consume without worrying too much about the consequences. It turns out he 
was overlooking some of the risks and negative effects of being a reserve currency, which will 
be discussed in the next section.  
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Figure 5: Impact of reserve currency status on U.S. cost of capital 
 
Figure 6: U.S. balance of trade since 2007 
 
 
 
Drawbacks for the U.S. Economy 
 From this author’s perspective, before the project was undertaken, the nature of the U.S. 
dollar’s primary reserve currency status was assumed to be beneficial. In essence, Giscard’s 
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statement of declaration of the dollar’s “exorbitant privilege” seemed true without any 
qualification. However, the reality is that the U.S. dollar’s predominant status actually comes 
with several potential drawbacks and risks for the U.S. government and economy. This section 
will detail what these negative effects are and attempt to estimate their overall impact. The 
smaller question of whether the ultimate impact of U.S. dollar’s dominant status is a net benefit 
or net negative to the U.S. economy is crucial to understanding the motivations behind the larger 
arguments of U.S. policy makers and those in foreign governments.  
 While seemingly counterintuitive, some of the benefits of the dollar’s primary reserve 
currency status paradoxically contribute to significant negative effects. Because the dollar is in 
demand abroad and the U.S. acts “as a magnet to the world’s official reserves and foreign 
assets,” the dollar’s value is inflated by as much as five to ten percent compared to other 
currencies (Dobbs, et al. 2009). When we hear the phrase “strong dollar” on the news, the 
assumption is that that is a good thing, but in reality, it can be either good or bad. For the U.S. 
government, the advantages related to a strong dollar are also the benefits that come with being a 
reserve currency in general – lower interest expense on public debt and seigniorage income. 
There are also intangible political benefits, such as a desire for the U.S. to be a hegemon both 
politically and economically. However, the strength of the dollar also has harmful effects on 
firms and industries with a strong emphasis on exporting. When the dollar is strong relative to 
other currencies, foreign imports (foreign goods/services) are relatively cheaper for consumers in 
the U.S.; consumers receive more goods for the same cost, one dollar. At the same time, U.S. 
firms struggle to export their goods and services to other countries because they are relatively 
more expensive. Perhaps less apparent is that a strong dollar can also negatively impact U.S. 
domestic firms that compete with imported goods. For example, the U.S. steel industry has 
33 
 
 
struggled in recent years because industrial companies in the U.S. preferred to use steel imported 
from other countries such as China because of its significantly lower cost. This impact on trade 
competitiveness is estimated by McKinsey to cost the U.S. economy between $30 and $60 
billion depending on factors like GDP growth and exchange rate fluctuation (Dobbs, et al. 2009). 
In addition to lower competitiveness, an increase in the strength of the dollar due can also be a 
harm to consumers in the form of lost jobs. Since many individuals in the U.S. work for 
exporters – exporting makes up approximately one-eighth of the U.S. economy – periods of time 
when the dollar appreciates can contribute to layoffs at these firms (Lange, 2015). From June 
2014 to June 2015, the U.S. dollar appreciated about 20% against major currencies, including the 
euro, the Japanese yen, and the British pound (Figure 7). At the large steelmaker U.S. Steel 
alone, the company was forced to lay off 2,800 workers in the first half of 2015 due to reduced 
exports of its products to Europe and lower competitiveness against steel from South Korea and 
China (Lange, 2015). Overall, one estimate of the total negative impact on exporting sectors is a 
loss of jobs between 400,000 and 900,000 (Dobbs, et al. 2009).  
Figure 7: U.S. dollar index from June 2014 to January 2016 
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The economic trustworthiness of a currency is generally perceived as a requirement for it 
to become a reserve currency. As a result, the current major reserve currencies are generally 
considered safe havens. A safe haven currency is a currency that is attractive to investors during 
times of financial and economic crisis. Safe haven currencies are considered more secure than 
other currencies because of the economy and government backing them. During economic 
downturns, investors sell riskier investments (e.g. in equities) and buy U.S. Treasuries and the 
dollar because it is assumed that they will protect the value of a portfolio as markets fall. In 
financial terms, the movement of money from riskier assets to safer assets results in “capital 
inflow” to the U.S. Capital flows occur when an entity sells a stake in a domestic investment and 
invests in a different, foreign investment. A large scale movement from a more volatile currency 
to a safe haven currency during times of crisis is called a capital flight. In general, capital flight 
occurs when capital flows out of a currency that is considered “soft” to a safe haven currency 
such as the U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen, the euro, etc. “Soft” currencies are generally more 
volatile because they are backed by developing economies and government and monetary 
policies that can be erratic. Given this background information, let us consider an example of 
how the dollar’s safe haven status helps to prop up its value. The general scholarly consensus is 
that the U.S. entered its worst economic downturn since the Great Depression in the late 2000s. 
In theory, the dollar, if it was a not a safe haven currency, would have depreciated because 
capital would supposedly have left the country for a currency that was perceived as more stable. 
Instead, the dollar only declined about 7% in 2007 (Eichengreen, 2010). Even though the U.S. 
economy was in recession, foreign investors and central banks, many of whose countries were 
also mired in recession, sold their assets and bought dollars because they still perceived it as 
safer than their own currency. Once again, the impact of this continued strength in the dollar is 
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beneficial for U.S. government borrowing; however, because of the weakness in the U.S. 
economy, the economic benefits are largely canceled out by the significant impact on trade 
competitiveness. Overall, the negative impact of limited export competitiveness is between -$30 
billion and -$60 billion in an average year (Dobbs, et al. 2009).  
Net Economic Effects 
 After considering both the individual economic benefits and drawbacks separately, let us 
now consider their impact together on the overall U.S. economy. According to an analysis by the 
McKinsey Institute, which used the period from July 2007 to June 2008 as a baseline for 
“normal” economic conditions, the United States receives a net benefit from being a primary 
reserve currency of 0.3-0.5% of GDP, which is approximately $40-70 billion (in 2009 dollars) in 
net gain (Figure 8) (Dobbs, et al. 2009). This calculation takes the net gain from the lower 
interest cost of government debt and the higher income from seigniorage and subtracts the cost 
of lower trade competitiveness. This estimate of the economic benefits for the U.S. is lower than 
a calculation by researcher and professor Barry Eichengreen of the University of California, 
Berkeley, who estimates that the U.S. receives a benefit equal to 1.5% of GDP (Eichengreen, 
2010). Eichengreen does not specify the exact formulation for his calculation, but he argues 
qualitatively that the U.S. government receives a substantial benefit from being able to borrow 
during economic downturns at a low cost of capital because of capital inflows (Eichengreen, 
2010). Unlike the McKinsey study, Eichengreen did not separate his estimate of the economic 
benefits into a “normal” year and a “crisis” year. McKinsey’s analysis used the time period from 
July 2008 to June 2009 as its baseline for the net income generated during a “crisis” year (Figure 
9). The study found that the benefits from primary reserve currency status were largely canceled 
out during a crisis and were in fact negative on the low end of the range. The McKinsey 
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researchers estimate that in a crisis, the net benefit is about 0.0% to 0.2% of GDP or -$5 billion 
to $25 billion (in 2009 dollars). These numbers suggest that during an economic crisis, the 
benefit of being the primary reserve currency is largely erased and not as much of the “exorbitant 
privilege” that Giscard suggested. The negative impact on export competitiveness appears 
especially troublesome during periods of economic contraction because of the negative impact it 
has on the profits of large multinational corporations and specific sectors that have a large 
exporting focus.  
 
Figure 8: Net benefit of reserve currency status to U.S. in a normal year 
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Figure 9: Net benefit of reserve currency status to U.S. in a crisis year
 
Chapter Summary 
 In this chapter, the economic benefits, costs, and net effects for the U.S. economy 
because of its primary reserve currency status were explored. The economic benefits include an 
increase in seigniorage, defined as income generated by the U.S. government because the value 
of dollars exceeds the cost of making them. Seigniorage is estimated to have only a small net 
benefit of $10-20 billion per year. The second benefit for the U.S. is a lower cost of capital due 
to high demand by foreign entities abroad to hold dollars. The U.S. government’s cost of capital 
is reduced by approximately 0.5-0.6%, but after adjusting for negative impacts on banks and 
other entities impacted by lower interest rates, the net benefit for the U.S. in dollars is smaller at 
approximately $90 billion. Next, the main cost for the dollar as a primary reserve currency, 
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limited export competitiveness due to the inflated strength of the dollar, was explored. Because 
the dollar is consistently stronger relative to other currencies than it would be without its 
dominant status, export-driven industries in the U.S. are negatively affected by reduced profits 
and substitution of cheaper goods from abroad. The negative impact of limited export 
competitiveness is between -$30 billion and -$60 billion in an average year. Finally, the net 
effects of the benefits and costs were examined together. Eichengreen estimated that the U.S. 
receives an extra 1.5% of income because of its reserve currency status. A McKinsey study 
analyzed the U.S. during a “normal” year and during a “crisis” year to determine the impacts in 
each case. In the normal year, the U.S. receives about 0.3-0.5% of GDP in net income, while in 
the crisis year, the U.S. receives a smaller 0.0-0.2% net benefit.  
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Chapter 4 – Prospects for the Chinese Yuan to Undermine the U.S. 
Dollar’s Reserve Currency Status 
 
Introduction 
 As the Great Recession raged from 2008-2010, the U.S. dollar was a popular target for 
some foreign officials in China. Chinese officials cited a host of reasons that the dollar should be 
replaced long term with their own currency, the yuan, in what Forbes described as “China’s 
assault on the dollar” (Chang, 2009). By March 2009, both President Obama and U.S. Treasury 
Secretary Timothy Geithner were forced to publicly acknowledge and express disagreement with 
the Chinese government’s concern. Other respected financial news publications, including The 
Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times, began to opine on the potential for the U.S. dollar 
to be replaced by the yuan. In this chapter, the reasons for and against the yuan becoming a 
primary reserve currency will be examined.  
Reasons for Increased Use of the Yuan 
 China’s growing economy is the first and most basic reason cited for greater usage of the 
Chinese yuan, in addition to the fact that China holds the world’s largest population within its 
borders. Recall that some of the characteristics of a global reserve currency are the depth of the 
country’s financial markets and the strength and size of the overall economy. In order to 
understand China’s growth and how it reached its current placement in the global economic 
order, let us consider the history of the Chinese economy starting just prior to the major 
economic reforms of 1978. The People’s Republic of China was established in 1949 after the 
Communist Party led by Mao Zedong gained victory in the Chinese Civil War. Chairman Mao 
Zedong instituted a command economy, meaning that “a large share of the country’s economic 
output was controlled by the state, which set production goals, controlled prices, and allocated 
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resources throughout most of the country” (Morrison, 2015). The government emphasized two 
major economic goals, rapid industrialization and a self-sufficient Chinese economy. The 
agricultural industry was collectivized by grouping small farms owned by individual households 
into larger communes. Industrialization was led by state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which 
controlled 78% of industrial production by 1978 (Morrison, 2015). SOEs made it easier for the 
communist government to centrally plan prices and output targets. Initially, the Chinese 
economy grew at a relatively strong rate, with an increase in real GDP growth from 1950-1978 
estimated between 4.4% and 6.7% (Morrison, 2015). Despite the improvement in China’s 
economy, per capita GDP lagged far behind other countries in the region at that time (e.g. Japan) 
(Figure 10).  
Figure 10: Per capita GDP in China and Japan from 1950-1978 
 
Source: Morrison, 2015 
While Japan’s postwar economic growth may seem to be an unfair comparison for China, 
it highlights a major difference between the two economies, the presence of political turbulence. 
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Mao Zedong led two major social and economic programs that significantly destabilized China’s 
economy (Morrison, 2015). The first program was the Great Leap Forward, the name given to 
the collectivization of China’s vast agriculture industry and the push for rapid industrialization. 
Private farming was banned, and the central government dictated a set of far-reaching farming 
policies for the communes. The failure of many of these policies led to a massive famine in 
China from 1958-1960 that took the lives of an estimated 45 million people and decreased per 
capita GDP by 20.3% (Morrison, 2015). The second major program, dubbed the Cultural 
Revolution, was primarily social and political in nature with the purpose of implementing a purer 
form of communism and removing any trace of Western and traditional cultural elements. This 
movement took place from 1966-1976. Despite the lack of direct impact on economic policies, 
the Cultural Revolution caused significant political upheaval that had an indirect negative 
economic impact, including reducing industrial production (approximately -14% in 1967) due to 
closures and shortages of raw materials, lower levels of foreign imports, stagnation of 
agricultural production, and a lack of highly educated workers due to university closures 
(Morrison, 2015).  
 In December 1978, the Chinese government led by Deng Xiaoping began to reform the 
economy by slowly decentralizing economic control and “opening up” the economy. One 
example of this decentralization was in agriculture, where private farmers were allowed to begin 
selling a portion of their crops again. Another significant area of reform was in trade. The 
government enacted trade liberalization policies, which lowered barriers to trading with other 
countries and attracted greater foreign direct investment in China. In the early 1980s, the 
government increased its emphasis on reforms related to exports. Before these reforms, foreign 
trade never made up more than 10% of total GDP. By 1986, however, exports made up nearly 
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35% of total GDP, and the large number of Chinese products in other countries has since become 
a cultural phenomenon (e.g. “Made in China”). Since 1976, China’s economy has grown at a 
rapid pace, averaging nearly 10% GDP growth through 2014. In addition, China’s per capita 
GDP has grown at an almost exponential rate, increasing from $163 in 1976 to $7,925 in 2015 
(Figure 11).  
Figure 11: China’s per capita GDP from 1976-2015 
 
Source: World Bank data 
 To better understand China’s economic growth in terms of reserve currencies, it needs to 
be placed in perspective. China surpassed the U.S. in terms of GDP (purchasing power parity) in 
2013 with a total output of $16.788 trillion. The U.S. and Europe have seen their shares of global 
economic output steadily decline compared to the rest of the world since 1970, while the 
economic outputs of China and other emerging countries have risen (Figure 12). 
 
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
P
er
 C
ap
it
a 
G
D
P
 (
$
U
S
D
)
Year
China - Per Capita GDP 1976-2015
43 
 
 
Figure 12: Distribution of GDP globally by leading country and region 
 
Source: Patton, 2016 
Despite China’s recent push to diversify its economy to be more self-sufficient and less reliant 
on exports, China still leads the world in terms of exports with a total of $2.431 trillion in 2015. 
As a percentage of GDP, exports of goods and services have declined from a peak of 37.2% in 
2006 to 22.09% in 2015. In comparison, U.S. exports as a percentage of GDP remain 
significantly lower at 12.55% (World Bank). Thus, the Chinese economy is now more diverse 
but still reliant on exports.  
 The question now is how exactly economic size and strength correlate to reserve currency 
status. An econometric analysis by Arvind Subramanian, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute 
for International Economics and the Center for Global Development, provides some quantitative 
support for the descriptive notion that there is a connection between reserve currencies and the 
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strength of an economy. Subramanian’s analysis determined the correlation between the relative 
sizes of different economies to their total shares of official reserves as measured by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The largest and most significant correlation was found 
between reserve currency status and a country’s leading status in GDP and trade (Subramanian, 
2011). In addition to trade and GDP, the third important factor with a high correlation to reserve 
currency status is a country’s net international investment position, specifically whether or not it 
is a net creditor (Subramanian, 2011). Because China has a surplus in its cumulative balance of 
payment position (i.e. it exports more than it imports), it is a net creditor. The U.S., however, is 
considered a net debtor nation because it has a negative net investment position. Countries who 
rank highly in fundamentals such as GDP and trade and possess net creditor status therefore 
would be expected to have a higher share of total reserves. Subramanian found that the U.S. had 
a higher share of official reserves than expected given its fundamentals (Subramanian, 2011). 
Statistical analysis supports the idea that the Chinese economy’s broad dominance may predict a 
transition in reserve currency status. However, given the historical persistence of incumbent 
reserve currencies, there is a transition period of a debatable length when moving from the 
incumbent reserve currency to a new reserve currency (Subramanian, 2011). The potential 
timeline for a transition from the dollar to the yuan will be discussed later in this paper. 
 In addition to economic reasons for a transfer of dominant reserve currency status to the 
yuan, some proponents have offered political reasons. The decision made by a central bank to 
hold a new currency in its reserves is an economic and a political decision (Liao & McDowell, 
2016). In many ways, China and the Chinese yuan present an alternative to the liberal 
international order that is currently pervasive with the U.S. and Europe as dominant powers. The 
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financial crisis in the U.S. from 2008-2010 sparked debate on both the U.S. role as a reserve 
currency. In March 2009, the head of China’s central bank Zhou Xiaochuan publicly stated:  
The acceptance of credit-based national currencies as major international reserve 
currencies, as is the case in the current system, is a rare special case in history. The crisis 
again calls for creative reform of the existing international monetary system towards an 
international reserve currency with a stable value, rule-based issuance and manageable 
supply, so as to achieve the objective of safeguarding global economic and financial 
stability (Chang, 2009).  
Despite the use of political language, Xiaochuan’s criticism of the U.S. dollar’s dominant status 
is apparent, and he brings up a few interesting issues. His suggestion that the world move to “an 
international reserve currency with a stable value” implies concern with the security of the dollar 
as a safe haven currency. His comments came about one week after the U.S. Federal Reserve 
announced an additional $1 trillion of quantitative easing through the purchase of Treasury 
bonds and mortgage securities. With the financial markets in the U.S. showing rare signs of 
collapse, the Chinese government was left with fears that its trillions in dollar reserves would 
suddenly drop in value. We know in hindsight that foreign purchases of dollar-denominated 
securities actually increased from 2008-2010, highlighting the resilience of the dollar’s safe 
haven status (Eichengreen, 2011). The Chinese and the rest of the world arguably did not know 
this for certain as it seems counterintuitive that a country’s currency would actually appreciate in 
value during a major downturn. In the short term, China likely wanted assurances from the 
Obama Administration that it would receive more concessions at the March 2009 G20 summit 
that would increase its international influence economically and monetarily. In the medium term, 
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it was concerned with receiving expanded voting rights at the IMF (Chang, 2009). Notably, 
China’s voting power at the IMF has been enlarged multiple times since the recession in 2009.  
From the perspective of the author, China’s move to start a debate on global reserve 
currencies during a financial crisis is interesting and consistent with previous policies. During the 
Great Recession, China’s economy continued to grow in spite of the downturn, and its 
willingness to hold trillions in U.S. Treasury securities gave it substantial bargaining power. By 
starting a debate at that moment, the Chinese government was making a long term political move 
to set itself up better for a future time when the yuan would be ready to take over. Although the 
yuan possessed few of the characteristics of a reserve currency in 2009, such as free 
convertibility, the impact of the statements by both Xiaochuan and the Chinese premier, Wen 
Jiabao, continue to be meaningful, especially on the general scholarly debate on reserve 
currencies. The Chinese government also realized that its reliance on both exports and its 
ownership of trillions in dollar reserves gave it little leverage to suddenly remove the dollar from 
its dominant position. Despite the Chinese government’s long term, deliberate strategy in the 
international sphere, the desire of many officials remains to increase political influence by at 
least growing the use of the yuan, if not overtaking all other currencies outright (Liao & 
McDowell, 2009). The idea is that a push for the Chinese yuan would result in higher Chinese 
“soft power.” Soft power is defined by Harvard professor Joseph Nye as “the ability to get what 
one wants by attraction and persuasion rather than coercion or payment” (Nye, 2012). China has 
recently attempted to increase its soft power through a variety of initiatives, including: spending 
on aid programs in Africa and Latin America, spending billions on the spectacle of the Beijing 
Olympics in 2008, and spreading language and culture by encouraging students to study abroad 
and inviting foreigners into the country (Nye, 2012). However, the question remains if 
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intangible, soft power benefits outweigh the potentially negative economic effects from 
becoming a global reserve currency. As will be discussed in the next parts of the paper, there is a 
substantial amount of evidence that suggests a potential shift to the Chinese yuan would have 
considerable feasibility issues and potentially be detrimental to the Chinese economy and trade 
position.  
Reasons Against Increased Use of the Yuan 
 While there are legitimate, theoretical reasons for increased use of the Chinese yuan, 
there are also significant challenges that could prevent its immediate use as the world’s dominant 
reserve currency. For many investors, China’s political system and its frequent interference in its 
economy and financial markets reduce their trust in the Chinese yuan. While primary reserve 
currency status is largely based on financial fundamentals, there is also a significant political 
component. To put it simply, the U.S. dollar is trusted more by investors at this point in time 
because of its backing by the U.S. government and because of the openness of the U.S. economy. 
High level Chinese government officials have stated repeatedly - in the last five years especially 
– that the goal for the yuan is a greater international role and influence. However, the consensus 
in academia and among practicing financial analysts and economists is that China’s capital 
controls are holding back the yuan from reaching the Chinese government’s publicly stated goal 
of a more internationalized yuan (“China’s Lofty Currency Plans,” 2014). The government’s 
actions in the pursuit of this goal have frequently oscillated between liberalization and 
protectionism. At times, the Chinese government has taken specific actions to increase the 
yuan’s role internationally by reducing capital controls that prevent the yuan from being traded 
and converted freely. However, almost as quickly as a step is taken forward to grow the Chinese 
yuan’s international role, a step is taken backwards that returns the yuan back to protectionism, 
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restricting its potential for increased use in the foreign exchange market. This idea that the 
Chinese government has wavered between protecting the yuan’s value while at the same time 
attempting to augment its global role is confusing, so the following paragraphs will illustrate it 
with several examples and provide additional context.  
 Despite the zig-zag nature of China’s actions in regards to the yuan, the long-term goal of 
the government remains increasing the usage and prestige of the currency worldwide. According 
to Qu Hongbin, co-head of Asian Economic Research and Chief Economist at HSBC, “China has 
a three-pronged approach to renminbi internationalisation: expand the currency’s role in foreign 
trade settlement -- it has already overtaken the euro to become the second to the dollar -- 
encourage its use in cross-border investment, and develop offshore renminbi centres” (“China’s 
Lofty Currency Plans,” 2014). Hongbin’s analysis of China’s long-term goal is supported by 
actions taken in the last ten years. In 2007, the yuan's daily trading band against the dollar was 
widened to plus or minus 0.5 percent. Over the last ten years, China has loosened its grip on this 
requirement, and it now allows the yuan to float within a two percent band of the daily value 
fixed by the central bank. Recall that unlike the U.S. dollar and the other major reserve 
currencies, the yuan does not float freely. Instead, the currency’s value is fixed to the dollar 
within a specific band set by the Chinese government. When the currency begins to move 
towards either end of the range, the Chinese central bank intervenes by buying or selling its own 
currency. The benefit of such a government-influenced system is greater economic stability for 
China specifically since it allows the government to quickly stave off a potential economic crisis 
by selling off currency reserves. In the last two years, with significant downward pressure on the 
yuan, the Chinese government has been forced to sell $833 billion in currency reserves to slow a 
precipitous drop in the currency’s value (Lee, 2017). While this intervention has arguably been 
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successful in preventing a significant loss in currency value, it has also resulted in considerable 
uneasiness for investors who do not know if the yuan is trading at its true value. Yu Yongding, a 
former academic member of the PBOC’s monetary policy committee, notes that “intervention 
can limit volatility, but it can’t change the trend. Ultimately, you’ll have to give up anyway” 
(Lee, 2017). Yongding comments that the Chinese government can only slow a depreciation of 
the yuan, but it cannot completely stop it. At some point, the government will be forced to 
devalue the yuan in response to downward pressure on the currency’s value. Because the 
Chinese yuan’s value could be reassessed and marked at a different value without notice, its 
potential to be a reserve currency is harmed. Investors and central banks, who desire 
transparency when investing in currencies, do not have any certainty when investing in Chinese 
yuan. The government-based currency system contrasts the market-based system of the U.S. 
dollar, the euro, and the Japanese yen, which are allowed to float freely. In the case of these other 
major currencies, investors and central banks do not have to fear that the currencies’ value is 
inaccurate or being intentionally depreciated or inflated. Until China allows the yuan to float 
freely, it appears that the currency will continue to struggle to gain much traction in terms of its 
use in international transactions. 
 Notably, Chinese currency intervention has drawn the scorn of government officials from 
regions around the world in recent years, and it was a focal point of current U.S. President 
Donald Trump’s campaign in 2016, who promised to label China a “currency manipulator” on 
his first day in office. The issue has been a source of tension between the U.S. and China, 
especially in regards to trade negotiations. Trump’s argument during the campaign was that 
China’s frequent devaluations of the yuan give the country a competitive advantage in exporting 
goods. However, the Trump campaign’s argument has become outdated in recent years as the 
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situation has reversed (Gough, 2016). During China’s peak period of economic growth in the 
mid- to late-2000s, foreign money poured into China as foreigners sought Chinese goods and 
moved to invest in new Chinese businesses. In response to this inflow of cash, the Chinese 
government kept the value of the yuan relatively stable, not allowing it to appreciate. The reason 
is because it did not want to hurt its large manufacturing industry, which relied on the weaker 
yuan to export goods at lower costs than U.S. manufacturers (Gough, 2016). At this time, U.S. 
lawmakers rightfully claimed that China was manipulating its currency to improve its trade 
position and was hurting U.S. manufacturers. However, in the last two to three years, China’s 
economic growth rate has slowed, and the amount of money flowing into the country has also 
slowed. The result is that some economists now believe that the yuan is either correctly valued or 
overvalued and should decline in the future (Gough, 2016). In the last seven years, the yuan has 
been one of the strongest currencies in the world, but its value has depreciated in a stair step 
fashion as the government has devalued the government a few times since 2014 (Figure 13). The 
recent depreciation of the currency highlights a different issue for the Chinese government. Since 
people are concerned about the decline in the yuan’s value, many are fleeing the currency to 
safer currencies such as the dollar, euro, or yen. A correction in the yuan of significant length 
could potentially undermine the Chinese government’s argument that the yuan is worth holding 
(Gough, 2016).   
 
 
 
 
 
51 
 
 
Figure 13: Yuan-dollar exchange rate from 2012-2017 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
 The presence of capital controls has also been a significant issue in the yuan’s rise to 
prominence. In October 2016, the yuan was officially designated as an International Monetary 
Fund reserve currency and was added to the IMF’s basket of reserve currencies known as the 
special drawing right (SDR). The recognition was a substantial victory for the Chinese 
government, and the official recognition by the IMF was seen as an elevation of the prestige of 
the yuan. The People's Bank of China stated that "the inclusion into the SDR is a milestone in the 
internationalization of the renminbi, and is an affirmation of the success of China's economic 
development and results of the reform and opening up of the financial sector" (“China’s Yuan 
Joins Elite Club,” 2016). Additionally, the central bank promised that reforms of its capital 
markets and capital controls would continue in the future. The process to add the yuan as an IMF 
reserve currency began in earnest in November 2015. During the process, the Chinese 
government loosened capital controls on the yuan. In April 2015, just before the initial IMF 
announcement, China announced it would allow foreign firms to freely convert foreign 
currencies into the yuan and began permitting them to buy ownership stakes in domestic Chinese 
52 
 
 
firms using their newly converted yuan (“China to Loosen Capital Controls,” 2015). Another 
example of China’s liberalization of its capital controls came in December 2016 when it began to 
allow increased access to certain domestic sectors, including railway equipment and vehicle 
batteries, while leaving access to many other sectors restricted (Martina, 2016).  
However, despite assurances to the IMF and to foreign governments that it would 
continue to open up access to its markets and reduce capital controls, China has largely become 
more restrictive of its capital controls in the past year. In November 2016, the government 
reversed its policies that mostly allowed capital outflows and began to restrict them in response 
to the continued depreciation of the yuan (Wildau, Weinland, & Mitchell, 2016). Through the 
move, the Chinese government was also seeking to increase its regulation of investment overseas 
by its citizens; the outward flow of investment in China rose to an all-time high of $161 billion in 
2016, which added to the depreciation of the yuan as capital flowed out of the country. By 
adding back capital controls, the government was attempting to retain stability over the currency, 
but the move upset both foreign investors and Chinese watchdogs alike (Wildau, Weinland, & 
Mitchell, 2016). In early 2017, the backlash against the government’s decision to restrict FDI 
outflows had grown. Chinese company executives spoke out against the reinstatement of capital 
controls, which had reduced outward FDI by 74% year-over-year (“China’s Capital Controls 
Trigger a Backlash,” 2017) (Figure 14). In addition to growing resentment both domestically and 
abroad, the return to capital controls greatly reduces the chances of the Chinese yuan becoming 
the primary world reserve currency in the short term. Without political consistency from the 
Chinese government, foreign investors and central banks have no assurance that the value of the 
currency will not be changed on a whim. Given the recent drop in the value of the yuan, the 
Chinese government is faced with a difficult decision: continue to prop up the yuan through 
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currency intervention and the reinstatement of capital controls, or reverse course and begin to 
fully remove the regulations surrounding the yuan. Without a freely floating currency, greatly 
reduced capital controls, and political stability and transparency, the Chinese yuan will not be 
able to continue to increase in importance moving forward. 
Figure 14: Level of outward mergers and acquisitions in China  
 
Source: Bloomberg 
There are also several economic and financial factors that could inhibit the yuan’s rise to 
become the primary global reserve currency. One important factor that the U.S. dollar possesses 
over both the yuan and other currencies is well-developed capital markets (Galati and 
Wooldridge, 2006). Recall from chapter 2 that as a medium of exchange, a reserve currency must 
be highly liquid, meaning that it can be converted quickly into cash at a low cost. Central bank 
officials who wish to intervene in foreign exchange markets to prop up the price of their own 
currency must be able to rapidly sell off their reserves and purchase their own currency. The 
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dollar’s liquidity makes it the preferred option for currency interventions by central banks; the 
dollar possesses both ease of conversion and high foreign demand. As a result, a foreign 
government can quickly sell its holdings of U.S. dollars in the form of securities such as U.S. 
treasury bonds and buy back its own currency to prop up its value. Additionally, dollar securities, 
in the form of U.S. Treasury bonds, have other distinct advantages over arguably every other 
currency security. U.S. Treasury bonds are issued by only one organization, the U.S. 
government. In comparison, the European bond market has twelve issuers of treasury bonds, and 
the same variety factor is true for the other major issuers in Europe and Asia (Galati and 
Wooldridge, 2006). In terms of total international bond issuance, U.S. Treasury bonds, European 
bonds, and Japanese bonds lead the world with nearly equal amounts of bonds issued; however, 
China lags far behind with only a small fraction of the total market share (BIS, 2016). The 
central point behind this discussion on bond markets is the importance of the dollar’s 
incumbency in this area. Because the dollar has been the dominant reserve currency since World 
War II, the U.S. government has had ample time to build an efficient market for government 
bond issuance. In turn, investors around the world have a large amount of trust in the stability of 
the U.S. market. For those investors who wish to invest in other government treasuries, there are 
two major and sufficient alternatives in European and Japanese bonds. The Chinese government 
can potentially increase its share of the bond market as its economy continues to grow relative to 
the rest of the world, but the challenge will be building sufficient trust from investors and central 
bank officials. 
An important factor in determining the depth of a currency’s use internationally is foreign 
exchange turnover. The Bank for International Settlements provides data for currency turnover in 
both traditional spot transactions, and in more complicated forms of foreign exchange such as 
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forwards, swaps, and options. According to the latest available data from April 2016, the U.S. 
dollar has a significant lead in terms of turnover over the euro and the yen with approximately 
$4.44 trillion in turnover, while the yuan has the 8th largest daily turnover at only $202 billion 
(Figure 15). In this specific metric, the Chinese yuan’s low ranking reflects one of the more 
common criticisms of China’s candidacy for primary reserve currency status: that the country’s 
economy lacks depth in its financial markets.  
Figure 15: Daily average foreign exchange turnover in April 2016 (by currency) 
 
Source: BIS Triennial Survey 
Another metric used by the World Bank to quantify financial market development at the country 
level is domestic credit to the private sector. This statistic measures the amount of financial 
resources provided by domestic financial institutions to the private sector and is correlated to 
both financial market development and general economic strength (World Bank, 2016). In 
comparison to other developing countries and in general, China’s growth in this area has been 
very high. However, it still lags behind developed countries, including the European Union, the 
United Kingdom, and the U.S. (Figure 16).  
Currency  Total 
 Spot 
transactions 
 Outright 
forwards 
 Foreign 
exchange swaps 
 Currency 
swaps 
 FX 
options 
U.S. dollar - USD  4,437,554   1,385,410  599,764         2,160,211   73,820  218,350 
EUR  1,590,573     519,363  177,530            807,131   22,290    64,259 
JPY  1,095,562     394,931  151,068            457,929   18,119    73,516 
GBP     648,576     211,054    92,005            305,393   10,360    29,765 
AUD     348,312     142,932    40,877            137,877     7,052    19,574 
CAD     260,408     104,551    34,482            103,060     4,256    14,060 
CHF     243,419       57,286    29,833            149,727     1,702      4,870 
Chinese yuan - CNY     202,055       67,555    27,984              86,030     2,618    17,868 
SEK     112,321       33,710    13,386              59,081       872      5,272 
Other currencies  1,195,130     387,906  232,425            490,168   23,213    61,293 
OTC Foreign Exchange Turnover - April 2016
Daily averages, in millions of US dollars
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Figure 16: Domestic credit to the private sector as percentage of GDP
  
Source: World Bank 
Chapter Summary 
 In this chapter, the reasons for and against increased use of the yuan were discussed. The 
Chinese economy has transformed dramatically since the economy was “opened up” by a series 
of reforms in the early 1980s. Once one of the world’s poorest economies, China now boasts one 
of the world’s largest economies and sustained economic growth. China’s high rankings in GDP 
and trade and its net creditor position in international trade suggest a greater role for the Chinese 
yuan, according to an analysis of correlations between macroeconomic factors and reserve 
currencies. Another argument in favor of greater use of the yuan is that it represents a rejection 
of the current liberal international order. The decision by a central bank to hold a specific 
currency in reserves is in some respects a political decision that could represent an endorsement 
of the currency or a rejection of another nation’s currency. The Chinese government raised this 
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issue during the Great Recession in 2009 and 2010 when it felt it had the largest amount of 
political leverage. Despite the increased regard for the yuan and other alternatives at that time, 
the yuan faces significant political challenges. After liberalizing capital controls in an effort to 
gain admittance to the IMF reserve basket, China has recently reverted to increased restrictions 
on capital flows into and out of the country. The yuan’s status is also hindered by the fact that it 
is not allowed to float freely. Consistent interventions to prop up or devalue the currency’s value 
harm its standing among investors and central banks who do not know if they can trust the 
Chinese government. The Chinese government gains greater stability in the value of the yuan by 
intervening, but it also raises undesirable uncertainty for foreign investors. From a financial 
fundamentals perspective, the yuan needs to make up ground against the U.S. and other major 
reserve currency countries in the overall use of the yuan and in the depth of its financial markets. 
In two key metrics, foreign exchange turnover and domestic credit to the private sector, the yuan 
lags behind. Wider acceptance of the yuan will require more entities to use the currency 
worldwide in areas other than Asia.  
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Chapter 5 – The Chinese Yuan’s Chances to Overtake the U.S. Dollar: 
Analysis and Perspectives from Both Sides 
 
Introduction 
 Earlier chapters in this paper have explored the possibility that the Chinese yuan will 
overtake the U.S. dollar. In this chapter, this possibility will be analyzed through the use of 
interviews with an American and a Chinese portfolio manager. Conclusions will be drawn on the 
chances for the yuan to overtake the dollar in the short and long term future. In addition, a 
potential timeline for the yuan’s rise will be established. Finally, the impact of a potential 
displacement of the dollar on the U.S. and Chinese economies and their political situations will 
be analyzed.  
Will the Yuan Overtake the Dollar? 
 The primary reserve currency debate has been defined and explored from the perspective 
of financial, economic, and political factors. In the opinion of the author, the U.S. dollar will 
remain the primary reserve currency for at least the next two decades. This opinion was shared 
by two portfolio managers in the U.S. and China who have carefully considered this topic and 
were gracious enough to share their opinions. Shayne McGuire is a portfolio manager on the 
Emerging Markets Equities team and the head of the Gold Fund at the Teacher Retirement 
System of Texas (TRS), one of the world’s largest pension funds with over $130 billion in total 
assets under management. McGuire has years of experience analyzing investment opportunities 
in the foreign exchange market and in alternative stores of value such as gold. He expressed his 
overall view on the idea of a displacement of the dollar by the yuan in this way: 
For the U.S. to lose its primary reserve currency status, it would require the tremendous 
ascendance of another economy. You would also need the U.S. economy to be weaker, 
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meaning people want to hold less dollars. It’s difficult to see what would make that 
change (see Appendix B) (S. McGuire, personal communication, March 2, 2017). 
Owen Caterer, the founding partner of Shanghai-based investment management firm Caterer 
Goodman Partners (CGP), provided a Chinese and international perspective on reserve 
currencies. Caterer makes the final decision on all investment opportunities for CGP and has 
written frequently for the company’s blog on how Chinese government policy impacts the 
financial markets in China and around the world.6 During the interview, he delivered a summary 
response to the question of the whether the dollar is vulnerable to China’s rise: “No, not any time 
soon” (see Appendix A) (O. Caterer, personal communication, February 16, 2017). The issue of 
reserve currencies is incredibly complicated, but I share the skepticism of the two practicing 
portfolio managers that the dollar will be replaced for several core reasons. The first reason was 
addressed at length in the last chapter, capital controls. At the time that the IMF agreed to begin 
the process to admit the yuan to its basket of reserve currencies and recognize it as an 
international reserve currency in 2015, the yuan seemed to have reached a relative peak in terms 
of its chances for becoming the primary global reserve currency. At that time, the Chinese 
government had loosened its restrictions on capital flight, increased the yuan’s daily trading 
band, and had taken steps to open up several industries and increase regulatory and legal 
transparency. These moves suggested the Chinese government was serious about moving 
towards internationalization of the yuan. However, in the last year, China has been forced to 
make a decision between its desire to see the role of the yuan increase internationally and its 
desire to maintain tight control of the yuan’s value. Caterer agrees, stating that “the Chinese 
government continues to have significant capital controls to help manage their currency. This 
                                                 
6 Caterer Goodman Partners’ Blog: http://www.caterergoodman.com/latest-news/ 
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does not engender confidence for foreign investors to hold the currency since they may not be 
able to get their money back when they wish” (O. Caterer, personal communication, February 
16, 2017). By constantly changing its regulations on whether or not capital can flow freely into 
and out of China, investors are left guessing. Similarly, there are general feelings of mistrust 
among foreign investors, especially those from democratic Western countries, because of 
China’s communist system of government. China has a reputation for being mostly market-
oriented from an economics and financial standpoint, but the government’s tight control and 
opaqueness in many policy areas often spill over into its regulation of the economy (Morrison, 
2015). In order to convince investors, central banks, and business leaders to switch over to its 
currency, China will need to reduce the uncertainty surrounding its government and economy.   
 Since the implementation of economic reforms began in 1979, the Chinese economy has 
averaged nearly 10% growth. In comparison, the U.S. has averaged approximately 2.73% GDP 
growth in the same time period (World Bank). While this difference in growth rates is large, the 
U.S. remains substantially ahead of China in terms of economic size as determined by metrics 
such as per capita GDP. In the coming decades, China will almost certainly move ahead of the 
U.S. in terms of economic output. Even if China moves ahead of the U.S. economically, it is not 
a guarantee, by any means, that China will have a large enough lead for the yuan to become the 
primary world reserve currency. In order for the yuan’s rise to prominence over the dollar to be 
assured, it will need the U.S. economy to weaken as it continues to rise because the dollar’s 
incumbency is too strong (S. McGuire, personal communication, March 2, 2017). As an 
example, consider the dollar’s position before World War II. The U.S. economy was starting to 
quickly gain steam, and the dollar’s use was increasing worldwide. Despite the dollar’s growing 
usage, it needed a catalyst to overtake the incumbent primary reserve currency at the time, the 
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British pound. McGuire explained in his interview that for the dollar’s rise, the catalyst was 
World War II (S. McGuire, personal communication, March 2, 2017). The U.S. funded war-
related liabilities across Europe, which greatly increased the dollar’s usage worldwide. The war 
also resulted in the kind of economic imbalance that is arguably required to facilitate a transition 
in the primary reserve currency. As the U.S. economy began to grow quickly, Great Britain and 
the rest of Europe were burdened by the high costs of war. By the end of World War II, the U.S. 
had taken over as the world’s reserve currency. China will eventually have a substantial lead 
over the U.S. in terms of economic output, and if the government commits to enacting the 
reforms needed to make the yuan accessible, the yuan has the potential to become the primary 
reserve currency. The amount of time it takes for it to successfully transition to primary status 
will likely depend on the presence or absence of a catalyst. Without some sort of catalyst, it will 
arguably take a significant amount of time for the yuan to overtake the dollar. In the case of the 
British pound, the catalyst was war, and the same thing could happen to the U.S. economy. If the 
U.S. was devastated in a large scale war that greatly reduced its economic growth and future 
prospects while China continued to grow at a rapid pace, then a similar transition in reserve 
currency status could occur. Another possibility is that the U.S. becomes burdened by a 
structural problem, such as demographics (low population growth and little immigration) or 
unfunded liabilities like Social Security, Medicare, or Medicaid. McGuire spoke at length on this 
issue, noting that it was hard to foresee a change from the dollar without some sort of change of 
the status quo: “It’s not like World War II where some countries were ascendant and untouched, 
while others were completely annihilated. It’s hard to see a situation as drastic as the one we saw 
between the dollar and pound” (S. McGuire, personal communication, March 2, 2017).  
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 While the Chinese economy’s growth makes the discussion possible, the Chinese yuan is 
still lacking in several fundamental metrics that support primary reserve currencies. First, a 
primary world reserve currency should be widely utilized in international trade. From December 
2015 to February 2017, the yuan’s share as an international payments currency decreased from 
2.31% to 1.84%, and its ranking fell from fifth to sixth among all currencies (“RMB Tracker,” 
2017) (Figure 17). The geographic spread of international payments utilizing the yuan is also not 
supportive for a greater international role at this time. Approximately 76% of the international 
payments involving the yuan originate in Hong Kong, which is the highest share in three years 
(“RMB Tracker,” 2017). Rather than demonstrating an increasing international reach, the yuan’s 
reach remains largely confined to Hong Kong and countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The yuan 
also remains in a distant eighth place among currencies in terms of average daily turnover, while 
the dollar remains in first by a significant margin over the euro and yen (BIS, 2017). Another 
important differentiating factor for a potential primary reserve currency, which was discussed at 
length in the last chapter, is the relative size and depth of the home country’s financial markets. 
From a quantitative perspective, the U.S. has a strong domestic credit to the private sector 
percentage and compares favorably to the rest of the world, while the yuan trails behind. 
However, simply looking at the domestic credit to the private sector metric does not accurately 
reflect the strength of the U.S. incumbent position in the financial markets. Despite the presence 
of economic turmoil during the Great Recession that had not been seen in the U.S. since the 
Great Depression in the early part of th 20th century, the U.S. dollar remained a safe haven for 
investors around the world seeking a trusted place to put their money. In addition, foreign access 
to the U.S. Treasury market and financial markets in general remained strong with minimal 
interruptions at the start of the recession (Moghadam, 2009). Once again, the importance of 
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economic transparency comes into focus. For the yuan to improve in these areas, investors have 
to develop greater confidence in China’s financial markets and in its regulatory system.   
Figure 17 – Currency share of international payments in February 2017 
 
Source: SWIFT 
How China Would be Impacted by a Reserve Currency Yuan 
 While it does not appear that the dollar will be displaced as the primary reserve currency 
in the near future due to foreign exchange fundamentals and political factors, it is important to 
consider how a shift in reserve currency status would impact both China and the U.S. A 
hypothetical change in primary reserve currency status would have substantial political and 
economic ramifications. For China specifically, the issue remains one of strategic importance as 
well as an opportunity to improve the country’s prestige and soft power in the international 
geopolitical sphere, although recent actions by the Chinese government do not suggest it is their 
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top priority. An important thing to note is that the government and culture in general are 
forward-looking, and actions taken now are potentially designed to set up an opportunity to 
capitalize on later. Owen Caterer explains: 
A reserve currency yuan is seen as important for prestige and the ability to project power 
beyond its borders. It is however not seen a core goal. The core and first goal is 
remaining in power by any means necessary and remaining in control of the main levers 
of economic management is a key part of this goal (O. Caterer, personal communication, 
February 16, 2017). 
Part of the government’s hesitance can be explained by the potentially negative effects of going 
all-in on a push for the yuan to become the primary reserve currency. One problem is that the 
yuan would have to float freely against all other currencies, and frequent currency intervention 
and manipulation would be discouraged by the international community. The Chinese 
government has been willing to reform its economy only to the extent that it will satisfy as many 
people as possible, thereby ensuring greater political control (Morrison, 2015). However, if the 
yuan became the primary global reserve currency, it would provide significant political capital 
for the government, who could herald the far-reaching nature of Chinese culture worldwide. 
Despite the political benefits for the government, the negative economic effects could 
potentially result in a popular backlash by the Chinese people against the government. One 
important impact of reserve currency status would be higher demand for the yuan, resulting in 
consistently higher than expected exchange rates of 5-10% (Dobbs, et al. 2009). A stronger yuan 
would have a negative effect on China’s export position as higher costs make their exporters less 
competitive. The Chinese government has sought to diversify its economy in recent years to 
include more services and has successfully lowered its reliance on exports as a percentage of 
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GDP by 15% in the last ten years (World Bank, 2017). Despite their best efforts, however, 
exports as a percentage of GDP remains high compared to other large economies at 22%. In 
comparison, the U.S. only exports 12% as a percentage of its total GDP. Given the negative 
political ramifications of lost manufacturing jobs, the Chinese government will need to continue 
to prioritize diversification of the Chinese economy in order to reduce export-related negative 
effects from the yuan becoming a primary reserve currency. 
In general, the promotion of the Chinese yuan to be a dominant reserve currency would 
lead to similar benefits that the U.S. receives with a few potential exceptions. It is difficult to 
make any strong conclusions in this particular area because the manner in which the yuan 
becomes the primary reserve currency would impact the extent of the benefits and costs it would 
receive. The U.S. economy currently receives a significant benefit from lower borrowing costs 
due to lower interest rates. The Chinese economy would likely receive the same benefit, but it 
could be minimal if there are still capital controls in place (O. Caterer, personal communication, 
February 16, 2017). With capital controls in place, the Chinese government would fund its 
obligations with debt purchased by Chinese and Hong Kong investors. These local investors are 
known as “captive investors” because their capital is limited to investment in Chinese 
government bonds. While this makes sense in theory, it is difficult to imagine the current capital 
controls remaining in place with the internationalization of the yuan. If capital flow restrictions 
were removed as a precursor to the yuan’s rise to prominence, the benefits would likely be 
similar to those enjoyed by the U.S. less a larger negative impact on exports.  
Dollar’s Displacement – Impact on U.S. 
 As discussed in Chapter 3, the U.S. currently receives an estimated benefit between 0.5% 
and 1.5% of its GDP in a non-recession year (Dobbs, et al. 2009; Eichengreen, 2010). Because of 
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the variation in how exactly the yuan could displace the dollar, it is difficult to measure how 
much economic output the U.S. would lose. Barry Eichengreen suggests the possibility for a 
dramatic shift in investor sentiment causing a massive drop in the dollar’s value, perhaps by as 
much as fifty or sixty percent. The economic ramifications surrounding the dollar’s collapse 
could reduce economic output by as much as 2% per year (Eichengreen, 2010). A rapid shift in 
the dollar’s value would leave investors scrambling for other currencies to hold. The euro and the 
pound would benefit in such a situation, and the yuan would likely gain a large share of the 
market and position itself for even more. Eichengreen himself admits in his book that this 
scenario would be a worst case for the U.S. In short, it is difficult to envision a scenario as 
dramatic as the one portrayed in his book. One reason against this situation is that transitions in 
primary reserve currency normally take years to occur. McGuire expressed support for a 
potentially gradual change when questioned on the potential timeline for a change in reserve 
currencies:  
“The notion of the yuan replacing the dollar as a reserve currency, I think that would be a 
very gradual change. It would be the impact of China’s internationalization, and that 
central banks realize that there is a practical reason for holding yuan. I think that could 
come in time, but for the time being, it’s still not there” (S. McGuire, personal 
communication, March 2, 2017). 
The potential for a rapid change in primary reserve currency is not impossible, but it seems 
unlikely given the current situation involving the dollar and the yuan. The dollar was in great 
position to overtake the pound before World War II, but the transition still took years to occur. 
Furthermore, the idea of a gradual change also reflects the theory that markets are efficient, and 
investors incorporate all public information when making investment decisions. Unless investors 
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were presented with information that suggested a drastic change in U.S. economic or political 
status is possible, it is hard to envision the U.S. losing as much as 2% of its GDP per year due to 
the loss of the dollar (Connor, 2013).  
 The biggest danger for a rapid collapse of the dollar may originate in consistent deficit 
spending, leading to higher accumulated federal debt levels. In the 1960s, economist Robert 
Triffin proposed that the U.S. government, as the supplier of the primary global reserve currency, 
needed to print enough dollars to ensure the excess demand for dollar reserves abroad was 
fulfilled so that economic growth worldwide could continue unhindered. In order to satisfy this 
requirement, the U.S. would have to increase its deficits in both government spending and in its 
trade current account (more imports than exports) (Eichengreen, 2010). At the time, high deficit 
spending and a negative trade position were seen as incompatible with the dollar as the 
hegemonic currency in the Bretton Woods system, but the presence of a government supplying 
the world with sufficient currency supply was also assumed to be necessary. This inherent 
tension between the national and global monetary policy interests of the primary global reserve 
currency country was termed Triffin’s dilemma. The situation today differs in that there are 
alternatives to the dollar in the form of the euro, yen, and the yuan, among other prospective 
currencies. Despite the alternatives, the dollar provides the liquidity needed for emerging market 
economies to grow quickly (Eichengreen, 2010). A sudden change from the dollar to a different 
currency would possibly result in a scramble to buy reserves of other currencies. 
 The question then is how the more likely scenario for a change in primary reserve 
currency, a gradual shift to the yuan, would affect the U.S. From a macroeconomic perspective, 
the displacement of the dollar would result in higher interest rates and inflation. An increase in 
interest rates can be explained by the fact that investors would require a higher yield to hold 
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dollar securities. Currently, the high demand for securities such as U.S. Treasury bonds keeps 
interest rates in the U.S. at low levels and provides the U.S. government an opportunity to 
borrow at lower costs than the rest of the world. In conjunction with the benefits of seigniorage 
and the domestic political benefits of funding entitlement programs, the U.S. government has 
ample incentive to run a deficit. Even if the dollar’s role is only reduced, this benefit would go 
away because it depends on the strength of the dollar and the enticement of foreign funds. The 
government would be forced to control public expenditures and potentially cut back on 
entitlements in a kind of austerity program. Without spending cuts, the risk would be further 
depreciation of the dollar as it begins to more accurately reflect its underlying fundamental 
value.  
The dollar would also potentially lose its safe haven currency status. This change is not 
certain by any means and would require a loss of faith in the U.S. dollar. The Japanese economy, 
for example, has been largely stagnant for the past twenty years. However, its currency remains a 
safe haven in Asia for investors concerned about the depreciation of their local currency. It 
seems more likely that a shift in reserve currency would be caused, at least partially, by a loss of 
faith in U.S. institutions. In this case, the dollar would not retain its safe haven status. During an 
economic downturn, the impact of this change would be fairly large and potentially positive. 
From 2008-2010, the dollar’s value against other currencies was largely stable and even rose 
against some currencies. The strength of the dollar made it much harder for the U.S. to export 
during a time of economic crisis, a significant drawback of being a reserve currency. The dollar’s 
value would also be lower in general during normal economic periods, further improving 
opportunities for exporting. In addition, the transition away from the dollar would allow 
policymakers to focus more on the domestic economy instead of the global economy. Any 
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benefits from a change to a more domestic focus would depend on the party and leadership 
dynamic in the federal government at the time (Goldberg, 2011). 
The loss of the dollar’s dominant status would also affect businesses and consumers. 
Companies that previously conducted their business in dollars would be forced to change to the 
yuan, which would initially increase transaction costs. Additionally, American consumers 
accustomed to buying goods with cash around the world would be forced to adjust to the fact that 
the dollar would no longer be accepted as often in foreign countries. While both of these issues 
may turn out to only be small nuisances in the long term, they would be a daily reminder of a 
yuan-dominated world. A shift to the yuan would also be an endorsement of the Chinese view of 
international relations. Currently, the Chinese government is seeking to maintain peace and 
stability in the world, partly because it realizes the costs of war and does not want to interrupt its 
economic progress (Nye, 2012). The government therefore gives off the impression that it 
opposes aggression, which may be seen as more attractive than the liberal international 
philosophy commonly held by governments in the West.  
Chapter Summary 
 In this chapter, the potential for the Chinese yuan to overtake the U.S. dollar as the 
primary reserve currency was examined through the author’s analysis and the lens of two 
interviews with portfolio managers in the United States and China. Because of the flawed 
financial and political fundamentals underlying the yuan, it is not expected to become the 
primary reserve currency in the next two decades. Furthermore, the dollar possesses a significant 
advantage in many financial metrics and in intangibles like trustworthiness by investors and 
central banks. In terms of impact, the Chinese government would receive a considerable boost to 
its international prestige and reap the economic benefits of lower borrowing costs and 
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seigniorage revenue. However, some of these benefits could be partially canceled out by the 
reduction in exports that comes with being a strong currency. In comparison, the U.S. would be 
negatively impact by higher borrowing costs, lower seigniorage revenue, and less mandate for 
government spending. Without primary reserve currency status, the dollar would potentially lose 
its safe haven status, which would be beneficial during times of economic crisis. As capital flows 
out of the U.S., export competitiveness would increase.  
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Conclusion 
 In the introduction, we met John, a fictional portfolio manager seeking to understand the 
effects of the displacement of the U.S. dollar by the Chinese yuan. The case study was written 
with the goal of depicting the worst case scenario proposed by some editorial writers in the 
financial media today. While the scenario involving John is unlikely, it would not be impossible 
for a structural problem to reduce the dollar’s role, while at the same time an ascendant Chinese 
economy ushers in the Chinese yuan as the primary global reserve currency. This particular 
possibility would be costly for the U.S. both economically and politically. The confusion among 
government officials, portfolio managers, and average people would be pervasive. However, the 
goal of this thesis was to examine the reality of the reserve currency debate, not just the worst 
case scenario. After examining history and the economic, financial, and political factors affecting 
both the U.S. and China, it does not seem likely that the Chinese yuan will replace the U.S. 
dollar within the next two decades. If anything is certain though, it is that China has evolved at a 
remarkable rate in the last four decades and will continue to do so. While the government will 
likely continue to waver between seeking an international role for the yuan and a more contained 
role in the short term, the long term presents a lot more uncertainty. China’s economy continues 
to grow at a faster pace than the U.S. economy despite the fact that it is has started to see its 
growth rate slow down. Even at a slower pace of growth overall, the Chinese economy will 
eclipse the American economy in our lifetimes and grow the margin between them. The ability 
of the Chinese yuan to become the world’s dominant reserve currency will be decided first by the 
Chinese government. The government seems to be biding its time in regards to the yuan. 
Currently, it is working on building goodwill worldwide and striving to diversify its economy. 
Domestically, infrastructure and cities will continue to be built. However, despite the amount of 
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progress being made in many areas of the economy, China continues to lag behind its American 
“competitor” in many areas important for its candidacy as an international reserve currency. 
Until the yuan begins to improve in crucial areas that the dollar currently leads, the yuan will not 
be the primary reserve currency. The areas where the dollar currently dominates include financial 
market depth and transparency, usage in transactions worldwide, greater access to markets, 
reduced capital controls, and restrictions on capital inflows and outflows. Furthermore, the yuan 
must be allowed to float freely against all other currencies, so that investors and governments can 
have full faith that the currency is trading at an accurate value without interference. The Chinese 
government will have to make a significant political sacrifice if it desires to push the yuan 
internationally at the level needed for it to reach eventual primary reserve currency status. 
Allowing the yuan to float freely and lowering capital controls will increase the currency’s 
volatility in the short term as China continues to further develop its economy. A stronger yuan 
would also put China’s large number of exporters at risk of being outcompeted by rivals in Asia 
and elsewhere in the world. Even with a concerted political effort by the Chinese government 
and strong economic growth, the yuan will likely need a catalyst for it to emerge suddenly in the 
next twenty years. Potential catalysts could be structural problems in the U.S., such as war, 
demographics, or insolvency due to unfunded liabilities. In the face of both domestic economic 
and political problems, the U.S. could be forced to retreat from its prominent international 
position. A struggling U.S. combined with an ascendant China could provide the boost needed to 
knock the dollar off its perch and replace it with the yuan. As it stands in 2017, however, the 
status quo will have to change significantly to displace the dollar because of its large 
incumbency advantage. The use of the dollar is self-reinforcing: because of the large number of 
institutional investors and central banks invested in the dollar, the markets for the dollar are 
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highly liquid and deep. High liquidity and financial markets depth further increase the demand 
for the dollar and dollar securities, and the cycle continues. To put it simply, the Chinese yuan 
will have the prominent international role when the dollar is not an obvious choice for investors 
and central banks alike.  
 There are several potential areas of extension from this topic moving forward. One 
potential continued area of discussion is multipolarity, the idea that multiple currencies could 
share the dominant primary reserve currency role equally. A potential benefit of multipolarity is 
its greater political neutrality. Rather than having the dominance of a single currency, there are 
instead two or three currencies sharing the burden. This kind of system would reduce the 
sovereign risk related to a single, hegemonic reserve currency system and prevent the countries 
involved from being loose with government spending. Furthermore, foreign exchange 
movements would theoretically be more inclined towards actual fundamentals rather than 
reflecting the volatile flight of capital for safety or yield (Smaghi, 2011). Another potential idea 
is to explore alternative reserve currencies, such as one based on the special drawing right (SDR) 
or on a completely new currency, such as bitcoin. These two possibilities would also entail 
greater political neutrality but would have significant financial and economic deficiencies. 
Bitcoin, in particular, would be a questionable reserve currency because of its low liquidity and 
high volatility. More research will be needed to determine the efficacy of these alternatives.  
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Appendix A: Interview with Owen Caterer 
 
Date: February 16, 2017 
Interviewee: Owen Caterer, Founding Partner – Caterer Goodman Partners, Shanghai, China 
Conducted by: Michael Laitkep 
 
How do you view the debate on reserve currencies in light of China’s economic rise – is the U.S. 
dollar vulnerable to being overtaken by the Chinese yuan as the primary global reserve 
currency? Why/why not? 
  
No, not any time soon. 
 
Firstly, the Chinese government continues to have significant capital controls to help manage 
their currency. This does not engender confidence for foreign investors to hold the currency 
since they may not be able to get their money back when they wish. 
  
Secondly, the Chinese government frequently conducts policy changes and manipulates the 
economy and rules to its own advantage frequently.  As a result foreign portfolio investors such 
as pension funds don’t trust the Chinese government and therefore do not invest. 
 
Thirdly, there are still far too many restrictions and rules around holdings of Chinese government 
debt, which has prevented the bond market from reaching a significant size or depth of trading.  
A large and liquid bond market is necessary for Reserve status to be considered. The opacity of 
government finances and what would happen in the event of a default also temper foreign 
appetite for Chinese government debt. The lack of independence of the judiciary is a key 
impediment in this regard. 
  
What kind of timeline do you see for a potential change in primary reserve currency? Are there 
any events or situations that would catalyze a change? 
 
I do not see the Chinese government allowing their currency to float freely in my lifetime. The 
ability to manipulate the currency supported by currency controls, is a policy lever that power 
jealous Chinese officials would be loath to give up.   
 
Only a complete change in the Chinese government’s perspective towards economic policy 
would allow them to float the currency freely. This would require at the very least, a complete 
victory of liberals within the Communist party which is unlikely given the large number of 
powerful vested interests littered throughout the Communist government leadership at all levels.  
More likely regime change (which would be very violent and politically messy) would be 
required for a change in this policy, but such a crisis would probably push back any 
consideration of reserve currency status by a decade or two. A financial crisis would not 
convince the government to float the currency because their natural instinct in times of trouble, is 
to command more control of the economy, pump stimulus through the government owned 
financial system and government owned companies to invest. Less control is a very unlikely 
policy response in my opinion.  
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What impact would a complete displacement of the dollar’s reserve currency role have on the 
U.S economy and/or government? Is the impact on the U.S. reduced if the dollar’s predominant 
role is merely reduced rather than displaced? 
 
The loss of the dollar’s reserve currency role would have a significant impact on the American 
economy. It would raise interest rates for both government and industry. A reduction is possible 
but no other currency is even close to demanding even a secondary role that say the Euro, in 
different circumstances would demand. The incomparable size and depth of the US government 
debt market is a considerable attraction to large sovereign and pension fund managers.  This 
creates strong network effects similar to a social network. All large investors want to be in the 
deepest investment market in the world so that their investment moves don’t alter price 
 
If somehow the US government were to lose its reserve currency role, then its ability to fund 
itself would be hampered and higher interest rates would need to be paid. Further, their ability to 
use the financial and banking payments system to its own advantage for sanctions (e.g. 
Iran/Russia) or to bring through compliance measures (e.g. FATCA) would be severely limited 
and impeded. 
 
How would an increase in the Chinese yuan’s standing as a global reserve currency affect 
China?  
 
It would force them to become far more open around finances and policy movements and allow 
far greater free access to their economy by foreigners. All of these would be a significant change 
from current policy trends. It wouldn’t change the interest rate they pay due to the fact that 
capital controls provide them with a large captive investor base.   
 
How does the Chinese government view this situation? Is a push for greater prominence for the 
yuan an initiative they consider important? 
 
A reserve currency yuan is seen as important for prestige and the ability to project power beyond 
its borders. It is however not seen a core goal. The core and first goal is remaining in power by 
any means necessary and remaining in control of the main levers of economic management is a 
key part of this goal.   
 
How does this issue specifically affect Caterer Goodman Partners? Do you and the portfolio 
managers at CGP see this issue as potentially disruptive for investors? 
 
It doesn’t have a large specific impact to us because we tend to avoid Chinese denominated 
assets for our clients. A move to a Chinese reserve currency would be disruptive but given the 
openness it would require, would also open up considerable opportunities in the Chinese market 
also.  
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Appendix B: Interview with Shayne McGuire 
 
Date: Friday, March 2, 2017 
Interviewee: Shayne McGuire - Portfolio Manager, Emerging Markets Equities and Gold Fund at 
Teacher Retirement System of Texas (TRS) 
Conducted by: Michael Laitkep, student at UT Austin 
 
How do you view the debate on reserve currencies in light of China’s economic rise – is the U.S. 
dollar vulnerable to being overtaken by the Chinese yuan as the primary global reserve 
currency? Why/why not? 
 
Countries are going to accumulate reserve assets in the vehicle that most effectively allows them 
to manage their currency. The most liquid, widely-used currency is the dollar, so that is the 
currency that they use. If, increasingly, things start being denominated in yuan, that will start to 
change. But I think that the notion that the yuan could displace the dollar ignores the fact that 
most people use dollars to determine prices of different global goods simply because it is the 
most practical. Goods would be traded in yuan if more and more people started using the yuan, 
but given the practicality of continuing to use the dollar, there really has not been any change in 
that relationship. I think it is just the practicality that makes the world use the dollar as their 
currency. Central banks hold super-liquid foreign assets (dollars) because they are the easiest to 
sell. If you need to dump $10 billion on the market, it is very easy to do for a central bank. If a 
central bank thinks China is ascendant, it might begin holding 30% in yuan. During a crisis, if 
the central bank is going to sell $10 billion in yuan, maybe the market is not that liquid. That is 
the reason for holding dollars; they are incredibly liquid. Central banks will use the dollar simply 
because it is the easiest currency to use for transactions. 
 
Two-thirds of the dollars in circulation circulate outside of the U.S. It really is the world’s 
money. And China does not have open financial markets. Recently, they have imposed severe 
restrictions on people buying assets outside of the country. That is because they are concerned 
about their currency falling. Everyone is talking about the yuan taking off and replacing the 
dollar, but the pressure right now is for the yuan to fall.  
 
Quite often, the notion of the dollar losing its reserve currency status is related to the U.S. debt. 
People quite often talk about our debt, which is out of control. But [debt] is out of control in 
Japan, in China, in Italy. Well, let us just say it is very high, relative to history, in a number of 
other countries. Everybody has issues, which is why I keep pointing to World War II because 
everyone was devastated after the war.  
 
What kind of timeline do you see for a potential change in primary reserve currency? Are there 
any events or situations that would catalyze a change? 
 
The notion of the yuan replacing the dollar as a reserve currency, I think that would be a very 
gradual change. It would be the impact of China’s internationalization, and that central banks 
realize that there is a practical reason for holding yuan. I think that could come in time, but for 
the time being, it is still not there. In fact, there is a long way to go for that to happen; we are not 
even near that.  
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For the U.S. to lose its primary reserve currency status, it would require the tremendous 
ascendance of another economy. You would also need the U.S. economy to be weaker, meaning 
people want to hold less dollars. It is difficult to see what would make that change. China is the 
second largest economy and still quite a bit behind the U.S., but it is possible if they just became 
tremendously important. They would need to open up their financial markets, which aren’t 
completely open. So if they opened those markets, more and more transactions would become 
yuan-denominated, and people would see the need to hold yuan. You would start to see central 
banks begin to hold a percentage of yuan in reserves, but you would also need to see the decline 
of the United States.  
 
A potential catalyst is war. If the U.S. was mired with a tremendous burden, but China stayed out 
of the war and had significantly fewer problems and is allowed to grow, that could catalyze a 
displacement of the dollar. Consider the change from the dollar to the pound at the end of World 
War II. Other potential catalysts are structural problems, such as demographics. The U.S. also 
has very high unfunded liabilities, such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid, eating up 
the government’s budget. But once again, China has massive debt and other issues. To keep the 
unemployment rate unchanged in China, they have to add 1.2 million jobs a month. Each country 
has their problems. It is not like World War II where some countries were ascendant and 
untouched, while others were completely devastated. It is hard to see a situation as drastic as the 
one we saw between the dollar and pound. 
 
What impact would a complete displacement of the dollar’s reserve currency role have on the 
U.S economy and/or government? Is the impact on the U.S. reduced if the dollar’s predominant 
role is merely reduced rather than displaced? 
  
In a situation where the dollar is gradually being displaced, inflation would start to rise in the 
U.S. as dollars are being dumped in favor of the yuan or another currency. It would push up our 
interest rates. Frankly, it is very difficult to see that happening because of the way the world is 
structured at this time. You would need the U.S. economy to weaken in addition to the yuan 
strengthening. If we consider the Japanese yen, the economy of Japan has been stagnant for 20 
plus years, yet the yen has not weakened that much over the years. In fact, it has strengthened 
and continued to rise. The reason is because of its current account surplus.  
 
By having a reserve currency, the U.S. has been able to borrow at very cheap rates because 
everyone is buying our bonds, and that is depressing our interest rates. That is the exorbitant 
privilege – we can borrow cheaply.  
 
How does this issue specifically affect TRS? Do you and the portfolio managers at TRS see this 
issue as potentially disruptive for investors? What effects would it have on pension holders? 
 
Assuming a gradual change, TRS would gradually adapt and diversify properly. Likewise, the 
market in general would largely adapt ahead of time in anticipation of the change.   
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